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Corporate Fiduciary Duties in Kentucky
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This article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Willburt D. Ham. The
article is also a belated offering of thanks to Burt for his decades of
teaching, writing, and law reform activities. No one contributed more to
the orderly and sensible development of business and corporate law in
Kentucky than Burt Ham.
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S ince the beginning of the 1980s, corporate fiduciary law has
exploded. Delaware courts have handled a large number of
important cases and their opinions have had a dramatic impact on the
jurisprudence of corporate fiduciary duties. Seminal cases, such as Van
Gorkom,' Weinberger,2 and Revlon,3 have changed the way we think about
corporate fiduciary duties.
Somewhat less apparent in its impact, but nonetheless important, has
been the force of the law and economics movement. As concerns corporate
fiduciary duties, law and economics scholars argue4 that, ideally, corporate
owners (shareholders) and their agents (corporate managers) should be left
free to fashion their own fiduciary duties without any intrusion from the
state in the form of state-mandated rules regarding corporate fiduciary
duties.5 Economic efficiency, they argue with considerable force, is most
readily achieved by letting owners and their agents pursue and price their
own preferences regarding the nature and extent of the obligations that the
agents owe to the owners.6 These scholars concede, however, that
bargaining between corporate owners and their agents is typically either
impossible or prohibitively expensive. The standard approach of law and
economics scholars to such bargaining impossibility is to propose that
states ought to enact default fiduciary duty rules similar to the rules that the
parties (i.e., the owners and their agents) would use if they were able to
bargain with one another.7
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). These cases will be described infra.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
3 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
4 The literature of the law and economics movement is enormous. For a sampling of
the literature generally, and its application to the matter of corporate fiduciary duties, see
Rutheford B Campbell, Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the Post-Contractarian Era, 23
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 561, 561-67 & nn. 2-29 (1996) [hereinafter Campbell, Corporate
Fiduciary Principles].
5 See id. at 565.
6 It is hard to argue against the idea that parties, in this case owners and managers,
should be free to construct the terms of their own arrangement when, as seems to be the case,
there are no significant externalities or third-party effects to the contract. See, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1428
(1989) ("Just as there is no right amount of paint in a car, there is no right relation among
managers, investors, and other corporate participants.").
' See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Ethical andPolitical Basis of the Efficiency Norm
in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487,494 (1980) (explaining that we can
infer consent "by trying to answer the hypothetical question whether, if transaction costs
were zero, the affected parties would have agreed to the institution"); Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1264 (1982) ("Optimal fiduciary
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In this article I offer an interpretation of Kentucky's corporate fiduciary
law. The article is positive, in that it attempts to explain our law by
reference to certain principles. The article is also normative, however, in
that it offers constructive criticism regarding parts of Kentucky fiduciary
law and suggests changes, refinements, and clarifications intended to
promote fairness and economic efficiency in Kentucky corporations.
Both the positive and the normative aspects of this piece recognize the
importance of. the common law developments in Delaware (and other
states) and.the importance of the law and economics movement. I suggest,
however, that Kentucky should be selective in the weight it accords to
Delaware jurisprudence. Delaware cases are unfortunately too often
confusing, contradictory, and needlessly complex, and thus they can slow
or, indeed, actually misdirect an orderly development of the common law
of corporate fiduciary duties.
. Section II of this article discusses the most fundamental issue in
corporate fiduciary law: the identity of the beneficiary of management's
fiduciary obligation. Stating the issue more precisely, to whom or to which
corporate constituency does the management of a Kentucky corporation
owe its fiduciary duty?
Section III offers a broad construct for fiduciary duty obligations. It
shows that courts-including Kentucky courts-vary the substantive
standards by which they judge the propriety of managers' conduct. The
applicable standard depends in the first instance on whether management
is engaged in its monitoring function or is making a discrete decision. In
discrete decisions, the standard changes depending on the existence and
depth of any conflict in which managers may find themselves. This
construct-separating duties in terms of monitoring versus discrete
decisions, and in terms of the existence and depth of conflict-provides a
sensible and manageable approach to fiduciary duty problems, even though
the broad analysis .is infected to a degree by a few poorly reasoned and
articulated court opinions.
Finally, Section IV discusses a number of specific issues and
transactions that are important in Kentucky fiduciary law. I offer
suggestions of the ways in which Kentucky courts can, in dealing with the
issues or transactions, ensure outcomes that are fair and economically
efficient.




II. THE OBLIGATION TO ACT IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF SHAREHOLDERS
A. The Law Generally
The question ofthe identity of the beneficiaries of corporate managers'
fiduciary duties has been around for decades.' Usually legal scholars have
debated this as a normative issue, arguing about whether fiduciary duties
should be expanded to protect, in addition to shareholders of the
corporation, other important corporate constituencies, such as creditors9 or
employees." Not surprisingly, this debate intensified in the wake of the
acquisitions of the 1980s, when nonshareholder constituencies, most
apparently creditors, suffered tremendous losses -as a result of highly
8 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 547-52 (2003) (summarizing various
theories and concluding that "shareholders are the appropriate beneficiaries of director
fiduciary duties"). Professor Stout traces the history of the issue back to the 1930s and a
debate between Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd. See Lynn A. Stout, Bad andNot-So-Bad
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002)
9 See, e.g., Albert H. Barkey, The Financial Articulation of a Fiduciary Duty to
Bondholders with Fiduciary Duties to Stockholders of the Corporation, 20 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 47, 67-72 (1986) (concluding that management owes corresponding duties to
bondholders); William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a
Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 106-13 (describing a historical and normative
basis for protecting creditors); Thomas R. Hurst & Larry J. MeGuinness, The Corporation,
the Bondholder and Fiduciary Duties, 10 J. L. & CoM. 187, 189-90 (1991) (proposing a
duty of fair dealing to bondholders during changes of corporate control); Morey W.
McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413, 413 (1986)
(arguing that fiduciary duties should extend to bondholders because indentures provide
inadequate protection) [hereinafter McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance];
Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 206 (1988)
(arguing that duties should be extended to protect against wealth expropriation during
takeovers and buyouts) [hereinafter McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders]; Lawrence
E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165,
1166-68 (1990).
JoSee, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts:
Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers; 69 N.C. L. REv. 1189,
1235-44 (1991) (arguing that fiduciary duties should extend to employees to mitigate the
effect of corporate layoffs); Katherine V. Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 48-53 (1991) (same);
Katherine V. Stone, Policing Employment Contracts Within the Nexus-of-Contracts Firm,
43 U. TORONTO L.J. 353, 363-69 (1993) (concluding that at-will employees need fiduciary
duties to enforce implicit promises of job security). For a completely different view of
employees and their need for fiduciary protection, see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract At Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 947, 953-55 (1984).
2004-2005]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
leveraged acquisitions and, in some cases, the business failures that
followed."
On the positive side of this question, the traditional view is that
corporate fiduciaries owe an obligation to act in the best interests of the
shareholders of the corporation. 2 Some scholars, however, disagree with
this traditional position and argue that, as a positive matter, today's
corporate fiduciary law does not require corporate managers, principally
directors, to pursue solely the best interests of shareholders. 3 Under this
line of scholarship, directors have the right to act in the best interests of
nonshareholder constituencies, even when such actions are harmful to
shareholder interests. Boldly it is stated that the "corporate law ...
generally allows directors to redirect wealth from shareholders to other
stakeholders."' 4 In support of this position these scholars cite, for example,
the right of corporate boards to make charitable contributions, language
from takeover cases that permit target boards to consider the interests of
other constituencies in corporate acquisitions, and constituency statutes,
5
all of which in their minds show that directors are permitted to take actions
that transfer corporate wealth from shareholders to other constituencies and
thus they are not obliged to pursue wealth maximization on behalf of
shareholders.
As a positive matter, I side with traditional scholars and conclude that
generally corporate managers are obliged by current legal rules to act in the
" See, e.g., Hurst & McGuinness, supra note 9, at 190 n. 14 (noting that since 1984,230
companies have been involved in transactions that resulted in downgrades of their credit
rating); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder
Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 931, 933 & n.2 (1993)
("From 1984 through 1988, the bonds of 183 companies... lost value as a result of mergers,
acquisitions, or leveraged buyouts."); McDaniel, Bondholders andStockholders, supra note
9, at 206 (characterizing losses to bondholders during this period as "possibly the largest
expropriation of investors in American business history").
2 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 468 (2001) ("The triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the
corporation over its principal competitors is now assured .... [That model has] duties to
serve the interests of shareholders alone .... [T]he standard model of shareholder primacy
has always been the dominant legal model in the [United States]."); Roberta Romano, A
Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L. I.
2021, 2031 (1993) (stating that U.S. corporation law seeks "to maximize shareholder
welfare").
'" See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 286 (1999).
14 Stout, supra note 8, at 1203. At anotherpoint in her piece, Professor Stout states even
more strongly that "Delaware gives directors free rein to pursue strategies that reduce
shareholder wealth while benefitting other constituencies." Id. at 1202.
Is See Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 285; Stout, supra note 8, at 1201-1207.
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best interests of shareholders.16 This seems to be the view most prevalent
among scholars, 7 and is also supported by cases 8 and commentary.19
There are and always have been, however, certain carve-outs from a
ubiquitous obligation to act in the best interests of shareholders. These
carve-outs are subject to a "reasonableness" limitation. Thus, even in
instances in which corporate fiduciaries are permitted to take actions that
are contrary to the best interests of shareholders, the extent of shareholder
wealth transferred to a nonshareholder constituency cannot be unreasonable
in amount.20 The classic example of such a carve-out is the generally
6 In a prior article, I offered a positive analysis of corporate fiduciary law based
roughly on Pareto criteria. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., A Positive Analysis of the
Common Law of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 84 KY. L.J. 455, 456-73 (1996). Under this
analysis corporate fiduciaries are obliged to make any move that makes at least one
shareholder better off and no shareholder worse off. Corporate fiduciaries are prohibited
from making any move that creates a loser within the shareholder constituency.
I note, however, that normatively I believe that corporate managers' fiduciary duties
should extend to the protection of other corporate constituencies, such as creditors and
employees. See Campbell, Corporate Fiduciary Principles, supra note 4, at 599-617
("Considered at any level, creditors' claims for fiduciary protection are at least as strong as
stockholders."). My normative view on this, however, differs from the view of the scholars
described in the preceding paragraph. They see directors as a "mediating hierarchy," with
broad discretion to move wealth among the various corporate constituencies. My view,
however, would impose strict rules on fiduciaries when faced with decisions that either
increase total corporate wealth (duty of care cases) or reallocate corporate wealth among
constituencies (duty of loyalty cases).
17 See supra note 11; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy
in the Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 45, 48 (2003) ("Despite occasional
academic arguments to the contrary, the shareholder wealth maximization norm . . .
indisputably is the law of the United States.").
" See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,182
(Del. 1985); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of stockholders. The powers
of directors are to be employed for that end."). See also the Kentucky cases cited at notes
34-38, infra, which do not amount to holdings but clearly indicate that Kentucky courts
view the obligation of managers to act in the best interests of shareholders. In addition,
landmark cases, such as Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d. 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (holding that
directors breached fiduciary duties because they did not exercise due care in pursuit of
shareholder wealth maximization), and Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del.
1983) (holding that directors breached fiduciary duties because they did not exercise fair
dealing in protection of the interests of minority shareholders), are consistent with the
obligation to act in the best interests of shareholders.
"9 See PRINCIPLEs OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 2.0 1(a) (1992) ("[A] corporation should
have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate
profit and shareholder gain.").
0 It may be, therefore, that my disagreement with the new scholarship described above,
which interprets today's corporate law as permitting directors to reallocate corporate wealth
away from shareholders to other constituencies, see supra notes 12-14, is only a matter of
degree. I concede that directors can make such reallocations, but my view is that the
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recognized right of a board to authorize a "reasonable" amount of
charitable contributions by its corporation,2 even though the contributions
do not enhance shareholder wealth.22
Constituency statutes 3 represent another such carve-out. These statutes
expressly permit directors to consider the interests of nonshareholder
corporate constituencies 4 and have received the most attention regarding
defensive actions taken by directors in connection with hostile acquisitions.
situations in which this can occur and the amount of the reallocations are severely limited.
Thus, if total corporate value is $100, and the value of creditors' claims are $10 and
shareholders' claims are $90, my view of the positive law is that directors certainly could not
reallocate $50 of shareholders' wealth to creditors (the result would be $40 for shareholders
and $60 for creditors) and may not even be able to reallocate $10 to creditors (the result
would be $80 for shareholders and $20 for creditors).
21 "The median level of corporate contributions has normally been around 1% ofpretax
income." MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 147 (8th ed. 2000) (citing a study by The Conference Board).
22 In A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861
(1953), the NewJersey court stated in affirming the propriety ofa corporate gift to Princeton
University that the gift
was made to a preeminent institution of higher learning, was modest in amount
and well within the limitations imposed by the statutory enactments, and was
voluntarily made in the reasonable belief that it would aid the public welfare and
advance the interests of the plaintiff as a private corporation and as part of the
community in which it operates. We find that it was a lawful exercise of the
corporation's implied and incidental powers under common-law principles and
that it came within the express authority of the pertinent state legislation ....
Corporations... with their enlightenment have sought in varying measures.., to
insure and strengthen the society which gives them existence and the means of
aiding themselves and their fellow citizens. Clearly then, the appellants, as
individual stockholders whose private interests rest entirely upon the well-being
of the plaintiff corporation, ought not be permitted to close their eyes to
present-day realities and thwart the long-visioned corporate action in recognizing
and voluntarily discharging its high obligations as a constituent of our modem
social structure.
Id. at 590.
A distinguished corporate commentator stated: "Donations should be reasonable in amount
in light of the corporation's financial condition .... Direct corporate benefit is no longer
necessary but corporate interest remains as a motive." Ray Garrett, Corporate Donations,
22 Bus. LAW. 297, 301 (1967).
23 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (West 2004); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717
(McKinney 2004). Neither the Indiana provision nor the New York provision, however, is
limited to acquisition situations.
24 For explanations and discussions of constituency statutes, see James J. Hanks,
Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and
Indemnification, 43 BuS. LAW. 1207, 1227-30 (1988); Alexander C. Gavis, Comment, A
Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors' Responsibilities Under State




The right granted under these statutes for directors "to consider... the
effects" that their actions may have on other constituencies,25 however,
similar to the right to make charitable contributions, must be limited by a
reasonableness standard. One would not, therefore, anticipate that any court
would allow a board to facilitate an acquisition that protected the value of
creditors' debt instruments or the jobs of employees but paid shareholders
only $1 per share, when a competing bidder for the company was willing
to pay shareholders $100 per share for their common stock.
Finally, one should similarly interpret the language from some
Delaware cases that suggests directors can favor the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies over that of shareholders.26 In what is perhaps
the most dramatic example of this, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated
in Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., that "a board of directors..
. is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value."27 At least
one noted commentator has correctly pointed out, however, that each of the
Delaware cases cited immediately above contains language suggesting that
directors owe an obligation to promote the best interests of shareholders.2"
But in all events, to the extent one reads the quoted passages as permitting
directors to favor the interests of nonshareholder constituencies at the
expense of shareholder interests,"9 that should once again be considered a
carve-out from the overarching obligation of managers to act in the best
interests of shareholders and thus it is subject to a quantitative
reasonableness limitation.
Two examples from the Principles of Corporate Governance" best
demonstrate how these carve-outs and the reasonableness limitation
operate.3 ' In one example, a company with $100 million in assets and
25 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 2004).
26 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)
(stating that directors, in choosing a course of action, may consider "the impact on
'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps
even the community generally)").
27 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
28 See EISENBERG, supra note 21, at 148-49. With regard to Unocal, see supra note 26
and accompanying text. Professor Eisenberg finds that different "passages seem to pull in
opposite directions" on the matter. See EISENBERG, supra note 21, at 148. With regard to
Paramount, Professor Eisenberg finds language from the case that "seems to focus on a
threat to shareholder's interests." Id. at 149.
29 Delaware does not have a constituency statute. These opinions, therefore, may be
viewed as creating a common law constituency statute.
30 PRjNcIPLEs OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 2.01 illus. 19 & 20 (1992).
31 The Principles of Corporate Governance states that "a corporation should have as
its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and
shareholder gain." Id § 2.01(a). Subsection (b) continues by describing certain limited
carve-outs to that broad principle:
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earnings of $13 to $15 million annually has a division that is losing $4
million annually and proposes to continue to run the division indefinitely
(as opposed to selling it), solely because the anticipated buyer intends to
slash the work force. The conclusion in the example is that continuing to
run the division cannot be justified because "the expenditures involved are
unreasonable in amount in relation to earnings."32 Shifting the facts for the
next example, the assumption is that the company will continue to operate
the plant only for three months, which will limit the loss to $500,000, "so
as to provide the employees at the plant a period of adjustment prior to its
closing." This more modest transfer payment to employees, the illustration
concludes, is justified.33
B. Kentucky Law
1. Kentucky Law Generally
One should expect Kentucky to follow the traditional approach on this
matter, defining managers' fiduciary duties by reference to the best
interests of the company's shareholders while confirming quantitatively
reasonable carve-outs of the type described above. Considered as a whole,
Kentucky statutes and cases support such a traditional approach.
Kentucky case law offers no significant support for imposing on
corporate managers either an obligation or a right to act in the best interests
of nonshareholder constituencies at the expense of shareholders. The small
amount of language suggesting some such duty to act in the best interests
of nonshareholders is from old cases involving bank creditors (i.e., bank
depositors) or special circumstances that seem to have no broad application
to the matter of corporate managers' duties.3"
(b) Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the
corporation, in the conduct of its business:
(2) May take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded
as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business; and
(3) May devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare,
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.
Id. § 2.01(b).
32 1d. § 2.01 illus. 19.
33 1d. § 2.01 illus. 20.
34 Kentucky has a few very old cases that suggest fiduciary duties are owed by corporate
managers to creditors. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Ryan, 190 S.W. 1078, 1080 (Ky. 1917)
("[C]reditors of the bank .., had the right to seek indemnity from the directors if they were
guilty of negligence in the management of the bank .... "). These old cases involve
fiduciary obligations owed to a special type of creditor: bank depositors. For these reasons,
[VOL. 93
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On the other hand, clear and strong language from numerous Kentucky
decisions" confirms the obligation on corporate managers to act in the best
interests of shareholders. Going back to the early part of the twentieth
century and coming forward, one finds language stating that "corporations
may be assumed to have been organized solely to make money for their
stockholders,"36 that "a director represents all the stockholders; he is a
trustee for them,"37 and that corporate fiduciaries "owe the duty of
exercising diligence and good faith to the minority [shareholders] to obtain
the largest amount possible [when selling corporate assets] and to protect
their interests."38 One also finds other cases consistent with such an
obligation, even though the language is less clear.3 9
they should be considered essentially irrelevant to the matter here under discussion.
One also is able to find occasional language suggesting duties to a nonshareholder
constituency. For example, in Enterprise Foundry & Machine Works v. Miners Elkhorn Coal
Co., 45 S.W.2d 470 (Ky. 1931), the court stated that if directors "misappropriated the funds
intrusted to their control, and a creditor was damaged by the act he had a right of action
against them for the injury resulting from their illegal conduct." Id. at 474 (quoting United
Soc'y of Shakers v. Underwood, 72 Ky. 609 (9 Bush) (1873)). Such language, however,
does not suggest that the duties to creditors assumed by directors are the same fiduciary
duties owed to the shareholders of the corporation.
31 One is required to rely on dicta from Kentucky cases because Kentucky has never
decided a case like Revlon in which a management decision facilitated a wealth transfer from
shareholders to other constituencies. Instead, the cases usually involve claims by
shareholders that managers violated a duty of care or loyalty. See, for example, the
description of Lewis & Co. v. Radford, 257 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Ky. 1953), discussed infra at
note 39. Courts, in rendering such decisions, are not obligated to decide whether duties are
owed only to shareholders.
36 Mfrs.' Land & Improvement Co. v. Cleary, 89 S.W. 248, 249 (Ky. 1905).
3' Haldeman v. Haldeman, 197 S.W. 376, 381 (Ky. 1917).
38 Kaye v. Kentucky Pub. Elevator Co., 175 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Ky. 1943).
'9 Lewis, 257 S.W.2d at 56, is an example, albeit one that is somewhat complicated
factually. Lewis & Co. owned a minority interest in Radford Company. Mr. Radford was the
controlling shareholder and a director of Radford; he also was a director of Lewis & Co. A
majority of the Radford Company shareholders, including Lewis & Co., sold their Radford
Company stock. Mr. Radford, as a director of Lewis & Co., was alleged to have violated his
fiduciary duty in connection with the sale by Lewis & Co. of its Radford Company stock.
See id. at 57 58. In the course of the opinion, the court characterized Mr. Radford's duty as
a director of Lewis & Co. as the obligation "to see that the investment was so ... disposed
of as to bring the most profit to Lewis & Company." Id. at 59. Such an action would be
consistent with the obligation to maximize the wealth of the Lewis & Co. shareholders.
Pursuant to another theory, Lewis & Co. charged that Mr. Radford, as a controlling person
and director of Radford Company, owed a fiduciary duty to Lewis & Co. as a minority
shareholder. In dealing with these allegations, the court observed that "[n]o act of Radford
impaired or decreased in any way... the value of the stock held by Lewis & Company." Id.
Once again, such language supports the notion of an obligation to maximize the value of the
stockholders' interests in their corporation.
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This obligation for managers of Kentucky corporations to act in the
best interests of shareholders is, similar to the traditional view described
above, subject to quantitatively reasonable carve-outs. In Kentucky these
carve-outs are principally based on statutes.
The most important of the Kentucky statutes in this regard is
Kentucky's constituency statute.4 ° It provides that a board,4' in dealing with
a business combination "or otherwise[,] ... may consider in addition to the
interests of the corporation's shareholders" the interests of various
enumerated nonshareholder constituencies, including "employees,
suppliers, creditors and customers," and may also consider "the economy
of the state and nation" and "[c]ommunity and societal considerations." '42
Although no Kentucky decisions have ever offered an interpretation of
this constituency statute, on its face the statute is extremely broad in its
applicability. Specifically, the "or otherwise" language makes clear that the
right of a corporate board to make decisions that benefit nonshareholder
constituencies at the expense of shareholders is not limited to actions taken
by the board in the midst of fights for corporate control. The "or otherwise"
language expands the application of the Kentucky constituency statute to
any board decision.
While broadly applicable on its face, it seems certain that Kentucky
courts would never read Kentucky's constituency statute to permit directors
to make unlimited wealth transfers from shareholders to nonshareholder
constituencies. Especially when one considers the strong language from
Kentucky cases confirming managers' obligations to shareholders,43 it is
highly likely that Kentucky courts would impose a reasonableness
limitation on the extent to which directors "may consider" the interests on
nonshareholder constituencies. This interpretation and analysis suggests
how Kentucky courts would handle a number of important fiduciary issues.
2. Charitable Contributions
Consider first the matter of charitable contributions. The Kentucky
statute explicating the "powers" of a corporation allows the corporation "to
do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs,
including without limitation power to... [m]ake donations for the public
40 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 271B.12-210 (Banks-Baldwin 2004).
4' The Kentucky statute deals only with corporate boards and thus provides no
protection for majority shareholders or officers or agents who seek to serve the interest of
constituencies other than shareholders. See id ("[T]he board of directors, in considering the
best interests of the corporation, may consider ... .
42 Id. (emphasis added).
43 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes."' Although
this statute considered by itself may be unclear regarding the right of a
board to authorize charitable contributions that do not enhance shareholder
wealth, reasonable amounts of such contributions are certainly permitted
under Kentucky's constituency statute.45
The result should give the good corporate citizens of Kentucky plenty
of room to make generous charitable contributions. Kentucky boards can
make unlimited contributions that further the interests of the corporation's
owners, and one should assume that courts will protect the board's decision
in that regard under the business judgment standard." In addition to
amounts donated in the best interests of the company and its shareholders,
the board could also authorize a quantitatively reasonable amount of
charitable contributions unrelated to the economic best interests of the
company.
3. Actions that Benefit Employees and the Community
Because the Kentucky constituency statute permits the board to
consider the interests of "employees" and the "community," one should
imagine that Kentucky would reach an outcome similar to the Principles of
Corporate Governance regarding the propriety of maintaining an
unprofitable division for the benefit of employees and the community.47
Quantitatively reasonable expenditures by a board "to provide the
employees at the plant a period of adjustment prior to its closing"4 would
undoubtedly be proper under Kentucky law, even though such expenditures
could reduce shareholder wealth. On the other hand, Kentucky courts,
similar to the illustration from the Principles of Corporate Governance, are
unlikely to read Kentucky's constituency statute to permit unreasonably
large numbers of transfer payments to employees generated by keeping the
plant open indefinitely.49
-K.R.S. § 271B.3-020(1)(m).
,45 The result of putting these two statutes together is to interpret Kentucky law
consistent with the Principles of Corporate Governance, which permit such donations "even
without a showing of expected profits... subject to a limit of reasonableness." PRINCIPLES
OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 2.01 cmt. i.
46 For a discussion of the business judgment doctrine under Kentucky law, see infra
notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
47 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.




4. Responses to Acquisition Overtures and the Right to "Just Say No "
The obligation under Kentucky law to maximize shareholder wealth
and the quantitatively reasonable carve-outs of the Kentucky constituency
statute are also important to the way in which boards respond to acquisition
overtures.
Consider a situation in which a corporate board employs a "just say no"
defense. Assume that, in response to an unsolicited takeover bid, the board
of the target company deploys a poison pill that makes it impossible for the
bidder to complete the acquisition. If one assumes that the bidder's offer is
two times the present market value of the target's stock, and also two times
the value of the company under its present management or any other
management, the duty under Kentucky law to maximize the wealth of
shareholders obligates the board to facilitate the acquisition by the bidder.
Even if the target's employees and creditors would be better off under
present management, the target's board must release the pill. Under these
facts, the loss to shareholders in not selling into the superior bid is too great
to be within the reasonable carve-out wrought by the Kentucky
constituency statute. If, on the other hand, the bid were only five percent
above the value of the company under existing management, protecting the
interests of employees and creditors may well justify refusing to release the
pill. That smaller amount of loss to shareholders for the protection of the
nonshareholder constituencies may be within the permitted range of
consideration appropriate for nonshareholder constituencies under
Kentucky's constituency statute.
Next consider a situation like Revlon,"° where two bidders are
competing for the acquisition of a target in a situation that clearly involves
a change in control of the target company. Assume that the board of the
target favors Bidder A and that Bidder A will protect the value of the
company's credit instruments and the interests of the company's
employees. Bidder B, on the other hand, will not protect the interests of
creditors or employees if it is successful in acquiring the target. Once again,
the target's board may not, consistent with its fiduciary duties, facilitate an
acquisition by Bidder A if Bidder B will pay 100% more for the target's
stock than Bidder A will pay. Under Kentucky's constituency statute,
however, the target's board may perhaps facilitate the acquisition by Bidder
A if Bidder B's price is only five percent above that of Bidder A's. This
smaller amount may be within the range of permissible consideration
allowed to nonshareholder constituencies under Kentucky law.
50 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
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An analysis of Kentucky law, therefore, suggests no distinction
between the situation when a target company is resisting a takeover bid,
and thus attempting to remain independent, and the situation when the
company is clearly going to be sold and the only question is to whom. The
broad obligation of the target's board in both situations is exactly the same,
and it is, subject to the reasonable carve-out from the constituency statute,
a duty to maximize shareholder wealth. Under Kentucky law, there is no
basis for the notion that a target board can hide behind a pill, if that is
contrary to their obligation to maximize shareholder wealth. A "just say no"
defense is subject to the same fiduciary scrutiny as any other board action."
5. Summary
One should expect Kentucky to continue to define the overarching
obligation of corporate fiduciaries in terms of the obligation to pursue the
best interests of shareholders. This obligation is subject, however, to the
right of directors 2 to pursue within reasonable limits the best interests of
nonshareholder constituencies, even at the expense of shareholders. 3
5' The court in Revlon reaches conclusions different from the ones I draw about
Kentucky law. First, the court declares that the board's duties change once the target is to
be sold. See id. at 182. Second, the court states that once that point is reached, "concern for
non-stockholder interests is inappropriate," and the obligation of the board is "the
maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit." Id. These are
unsound and confusing rules.
There is no reason to change to the board's obligation to the corporate constituencies
in the case of a sale of the company. The moral and economic claims for nonshareholder
constituencies do not change depending on whether or not the company is for sale. There
certainly is no hint in Kentucky law that the right to consider to a reasonable extent the
interests of nonshareholder constituencies is lost when the company is put up for sale.
Indeed, such a position would seem to be inconsistent with Kentucky's constituency statute.
Another problem with Revlon is that one is left at a loss regarding the obligation of
managers prior to the point at which the company is put up for sale. One possible way to
interpret Revlon is to read it as allowing a reasonable carve-out on behalf of nonshareholder
constituencies prior to the point the company is put up for sale, and allowing no such
carve-out once the company is on the block. That interpretation, however, does not answer
the question of why the right to make such a reasonable carve-out disappears when the
company is put up for sale.
In any event, Kentucky law seems to support a uniform duty on the board in an
acquisition situation. The duty is to promote the interests of shareholders, subject to the right
to make limited transfer payments to the nonshareholder constituencies enumerated in
Kentucky's constituency statute.
52 The Kentucky constituency statute applies only to the "board of directors." K.R.S.
§ 271B.12-210 (Banks-Baldwin 2004). It is uncertain the extent to which, if at all, officers
of a Kentucky corporation may pursue a course of conduct that promotes nonshareholder
constituencies at the expense of shareholders. As described earlier, Delaware's common law
has established what may be viewed as the equivalent of a constituency statute. See supra
notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
" In concluding this section, it is worth re-emphasizing that the carve-outs that
empower Kentucky boards to pursue the interests of nonshareholder constituencies at the
expense of shareholders amount to a right for the board as opposed to an obligation. Thus,
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III. FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES RESPECTING DISCRETE DECISIONS
AND RESPECTING MONITORING
A. Generally-Discrete Decisions; Monitoring
Typically, managers' duties are separated into discrete decision-
making54 and monitoring" functions, and different fiduciary standards are
applied to these two separate management functions. 6
B. Discrete Decisions
1. The Law Generally
The fiduciary obligations applicable to managers' discrete decisions are
often described under the rubrics of duty of care and duty of loyalty. 7
Typically, the duty of care obligates managers not to make careless
decisions that are hurtful to their corporation, and the duty of loyalty
obligates managers to act fairly in relation to their corporation.5
A more illuminating approach to the fiduciary duties applicable to
managers' discrete decisionmaking, however, focuses on the existence and
a corporate board would not violate its fiduciary duties by facilitating a highly leveraged
acquisition that expropriates for shareholders a significant amount of creditor value or is
contrary to the best interests of employees or the community. No fiduciary duties are owed
to any ofthose constituencies. On the other hand, the board would violate its fiduciary duties
by facilitating an unreasonable amount of wealth from shareholders on the one hand to
creditors or employees on the other.
5 See infra notes 57-77 for a discussion of duties relating to discrete decisions.
5 Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920), is an example of a monitoring case. In Bates,
the board was accused of inaction that enabled a cashier to expropriate nearly all of the
assets of a bank. See id at 526-29.
Normally, one may focus on directors, as opposed to officers, in considering a
monitoring function, and certainly in this post-Enron world it is those managers that have
received the most attention. Nonetheless, it is clear that officers have monitoring obligations.
Most obviously, a CEO has a fiduciary obligation to ensure that he monitors lower level
officers to ensure they do not misappropriate company assets.
" For example, the Principles of Corporate Governance provides for an overall
negligence standard for directors or officers, but this gives way to the more lax business
judgment standard in situations where discrete decisions are involved. PRINCIPLES OF CORP.
GOVERNANCE § 401 (c) ("A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith
fulfills the duty... if[he or she] ... rationally believes that the business judgment is in the
best interests of the corporation.").
" This, for example, is the way standard law school case books order their presentation
of fiduciary duties. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 21, at 520, 599.




the extent of any conflict of interest within which the particular corporate
managers may be operating. This analysis is based on the recognition that
courts, in evaluating the propriety of managers' decisionmaking, will
require an enhanced duty of managers when their actions are conflicted.
Courts have utilized both a procedural mechanism and a substantive
standard to deal with conflicted decisionmaking by fiduciaries.
Procedurally, as the conflict intensifies for the fiduciary, courts tend to
reallocate the burden of proof to the defendant-the fiduciary.
Substantively, as the fiduciary's conflict intensifies, courts tend to abandon
forgiving standards-gross negligence, for example-and require higher
levels of care-negligence, for example.
Three classic corporate fiduciary duty cases-Van Gorkom,59
Weinberger,60 and Revlon6"1-are illustrative of the way courts have dealt
with these matters.
Van Gorkom involved non-conflicted actions by the board of Trans
Union facilitating a friendly, arm's length acquisition of Trans Union by
the Pritzker interests. In evaluating the propriety of the board's actions, the
court applied the business judgment test.62 Procedurally, the business
judgment test allocates the burden of proofto the plaintiffs.63 Substantively,
this test obligates the directors to act reasonably in investigating the
decision and not to be grossly negligent at the decisionmaking stage.64 As
applied in Van Gorkom, this required Trans Union's board reasonably to
investigate the question of whether the Pritzker bid maximized shareholder
9 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
o Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
6' Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
62 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
" The court speaks in terms of a "presumption" in favor of the directors. Id. at 872
("[T]he party attacking a board decision as uninformed must rebut the presumption."). For
a criticism of this language, see infra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
6 The Van Gorkom court makes utter hash of the substantive standards of care to be
used in business judgment cases, using two different standards of care to describe both the
fiduciary's duty at the inquiry stage and the fiduciary's duty at the decisionmaking stage.
In discussing directors' obligations under the business judgment standard at the inquiry
stage, the court at one point states the obligation in terms of a duty to inform themselves,
"prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to
them." Id. at 872 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)) (emphasis
added). On the next page of the opinion, however, the court states that "the concept of gross
negligence is also the proper standard for determining whether a business judgment ... was
an informed one." Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (emphasis added). In its conclusion, the
court confuses the standard applicable at the decisionmaking stage by declaring that "Trans
Union's Board was grossly negligent in that it failed to act with informed reasonable
deliberation." Id. at 881 (emphasis added).
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wealth,65 and the board's decision to approve and support the acquisition
must not have been grossly negligent on this point.66 The business judgment
rule, therefore, is deferential to and protective of directors. Procedurally,
it puts complaining shareholders to their proof, and substantively it
exonerates directors for poor decisions unless those decisions were so
stupid as to amount to an extreme deviation from ordinary care.67
Weinberger involved a deeply conflicted action by the board of UOP
when it facilitated the freezeout of UOP's minority shareholders through
a merger of UOP into Signal, UOP's controlling shareholder.68 In
evaluating the propriety ofthe actions of the board69 of UOP, the court used
the intrinsic fairness standard, which procedurally shifts the burden of
proof to the defendants and changes the applicable substantive standard to
a demanding "fairness" test.7" Compared to the business judgment standard,
the intrinsic fairness standard is much more demanding on a board accused
of improprieties, since it holds the board to a materially higher standard and
reassigns to the board the burden of establishing compliance with that
higher standard.
In Revlon, the depth of the board's conflict was somewhere between
the deep conflict in Weinberger and the unconflicted setting in Van
Gorkom.7" Revlon was hit with a hostile takeover bid from Pantry Pride. In
response, the board deployed a number of defensive measures designed to
65 The board failed in this duty. Id. at 874 ("the Board of Directors did not reach an
informed business judgment").
66 At one point in the case, the court described the standard for directors at the
decisionmaking stage as "gross negligence." Id. at 873. At another point in the opinion,
however, the court described the standard as requiring that directors must have an "honest
belief' that the decision benefitted the company. Id. at 872.
67 In Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977), the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit defined recklessness as "an extreme departure from
the standards of ordinary care." Id. at 1045. This is an apt description of "gross negligence"
in the context of the business judgment rule. Thus, for conduct to amount to gross negligence
it must be more than simple or ordinary negligence. It must be more than a minor deviation
from the reasonableness standard. To be grossly negligent, a board's decision must be so
stupid as to amount to "an extreme departure" from the reasonableness standard.
68 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
69 The defendants in Weinberger included UOP, Inc.'s parent, Signal, and the directors
of UOP. See id.
70 See id In considering whether the transaction met the fairness standard, the court
considered both the matters of process--"fair dealing"-and the price received by the
minority shareholders who were frozen out--"fair price." Although the court bifurcated the
issue for analytical purposes, the court emphasized that "the test for fairness is not a
bifurcated one .... All aspects of the issue must be examined as a whole, since the question
is one of entire fairness." Id. at 711.




thwart Pantry Pride's bid and to ensure that the competing white knight,72
Forstman Little, would be the successful acquirer of Revlon.73 The court,
in evaluating the propriety of the defensive tactics used by Revlon,
concluded that a board reacting to hostile bids operates under the "specter"
of a conflict,74 which means that the depth of the conflict is somewhere
between an unconflicted situation (Van Gorkom) and a deep conflict
(Weinberger). In such a quasi-conflicted situation, the fiduciary principles
applied by the Revlon court were a blend of business judgment and intrinsic
fairness. The burden of proof was assigned to the defendant, similar to an
intrinsic fairness case.75 The substantive standard applied was similar to the
business judgment standard,76 except the criterion applied to the actual
decisionmaking-the decision to approve the deployment of the defensive
tactics-was enhanced to a reasonableness, or negligence, standard, as
opposed to the gross negligence standard applied to the decisionmaking in
a business judgment case. The language of the case required that the actual
decision to deploy defensive tactics must have been "reasonable in relation
to the threat posed.
77
Considered together, these three cases demonstrate the enhanced
scrutiny courts give to discrete decisions made by corporate fiduciaries as
the decisionmaker's conflict deepens. They show that this enhanced
scrutiny takes the form of the application of higher substantive standards
to the fiduciary's conduct and a reassignment of the burden of proof.
This analysis provides a workable analytical framework with which to
evaluate and understand what is expected of fiduciaries. In short, if the
fiduciary is unconflicted, she will be held to a negligence standard at the
investigation stage, a gross negligence standard at the decisionmaking
stage, and the burden of proof will be on the plaintiff. If the fiduciary is in
a quasi-conflicted situation, she will be held to a negligence standard at the
investigation stage, negligence at the decisionmaking stage, and the burden
will be on the fiduciary to justify her conduct under that standard. Finally,
72 A "white knight" is a "person or corporation that rescues the target of an unfriendly
corporate takeover, esp. by acquiring a controlling interest in the target corporation or by
making a competing tender offer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1591 (7th ed. 1999).
3 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.
7 The court found "the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders." Id. at 180 (quoting
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (1985)).
7 Id. ("This potential for conflict places upon the directors the burden of proving
I6 ld. (stating that directors must show "good faith and reasonable investigation").
I d. (emphasis added).
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if the fiduciary is deeply conflicted, she will be held to a fairness standard
and Will bear the burden of proof.
2. Kentucky Law
Kentucky law similarly suggests that fiduciary duties should intensify
as the depth of the corporate fiduciary's conflict increases.78
a. Non-Conflicted Discrete Decisions
i. Kentucky's Business.Judgment Statutes: Standards of Conduct
Considering first non-conflicted actions, Kentucky has two applicable
statutes: one applies to directors79 and the other applies to officers.80 Each
offers the respective, unconflicted fiduciaries the protection of the business
judgment standard!'
This is best demonstrated by a number of Kentucky cases which over the years have
indicated that enhanced fiduciary standards apply to corporate managers Who are conflicted.
See Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Sulip. 105, 116-17 (W.D. Ky. 1951) (applying Kentucky law)
(holding directors liable only for actual fraud or constructive fraud, defining constructive
fraud as harmful, conflicted actions, even if done in good faith with no purpose to harm);
Venus Oil Corp. v. Gardner, 50 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Ky. 1932) ("[The] court may not
intervene or interfere in the internal affairs of a corporation at the instance of minority
stockholders, unless its governing authorities have acted or are threatening to act
fraudulently, in the broad sense, against them or have abused the implied trust reposed in
officers and directors in such manner or to such extent as to warrant the interposition of
equity."); Enter. Fotindry & Mach. Works v. Miners' Elkhorn Coal Co., 45 S.W.2d 470, 474
(Ky. 1931) ("1W]heR the directors themselves ... mortgage or sell the property of the
corporation to themselves ... a different rule obtains from that where the property is sold
to a third person in good faith and for a valuable consideration."); Haldeman v. Haldeman,
197 S.W. 376,381 (Ky. 1917) ("The courts will not interfere with this management confided
in the officers of the corporation so long as it keeps within the limits of its charter, and does
not act fraudulently."); Beha v. Martin, 171 S.W. 393, 395 (Ky. 1914) ("[Aldoption [of the
conflicted transaction] must not be brought about by unfair or improper means, and must not
be illegal or fraudulent, or oppressive towards those stockholders who oppose it."); Poutch
v. Nat'l Foundry & Mach. Co., 143 S.W. 1003, 1004 (Ky. 1912) ("[T]he presumption is that
directors act in their own interest... [when they vote a salary to themselves], and that the
burden of proof is on them to show the fairness of the transaction."); Allied Ready Mix Co.
v. Allen, 994 S.W.2d 4,9 (Ky. App. 1999) (applying different standards in judging propriety
of conduct of a special litigation committee and a board, depending on whether demand was
made or excused).
K.R.S. § 271B.300 (Banks-Baldwin 2004).
'0 § 271B.420.
" Neither statute on its face distinguishes between conflicted and unconflicted
decisions. It seems certain, therefore, that the statutes would cover unconflicted decisions
of officers and directors. Later I argue against extending the protection of the statutes to
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Kentucky's businessjudgment statutes, similar to the articulation of the
business judgment standard from Van Gorkom, bifurcate the fiduciary's
action into the inquiry stage and the decisionmaking stage and require
different standards for each. Thus, they require the fiduciary to act in "good
faith" and, at the investigation stage, to make her "inquiry" "with the care
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances." 2 At the decisionmaking stage, Kentucky business judg-
ment, similar to Van Gorkom, lowers the expectations for the fiduciary. The
fiduciary has complied with her duties if she "honestly believes [the
decision or action] to be in the best interests of the corporation.,
83
The Kentucky business judgment provisions do not address the matter
of the burden of proof when, for example, disgruntled shareholders press
a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the directors of a corporation. As
a result, the normal rule would apply, which allocates the burden of proof
obligation to the plaintiff. This is the same allocation rule that generally
applies in business judgment cases outside Kentucky.84
The Kentucky business judgment statutes, by clearly articulating
negligence as the standard applicable at the inquiry or investigation stage,s"
avoid the confusion wrought by the Van Gorkom court, which articulated
the inquiry duty both in terms of a negligence and a gross negligence
standard.86 On the other hand, the meaning of "honestly believes," which
is the applicable standard under Kentucky's business judgment statutes for
nonconflicted managers at the decisionmaking stage, requires some
interpretation." No Kentucky court has ever had occasion to interpret this
conflicted actions taken by officers and directors. See infra notes 119-122 and
accompanying text.
82 K.R.S. § 271B.300.
83 The Kentucky statute governing directors' fiduciary obligations states:
(1) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of a committee:
(a) In good faith;
(b) On an informed basis; and
(c) In a manner he honestly believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
(2) A director shall be considered to discharge his duties on an informed basis if
he makes, with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances, inquiry into the business and affairs of the
corporation, or into a particular action to be taken or decision to be made.
Id. The statute governing officers' fiduciary obligations contains similar language. See id.
§ 271B.8-420.84 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
S SeeK.R.S. §§ 271B.300, 271B.8-420.
86 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
87 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
2004-2005]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
standard. Both the words of the statute and persuasive authority, however,
strongly suggest that the "honestly believes" standard should be interpreted
as the equivalent of gross negligence. Gross negligence, in turn, is best
described as an extreme departure from ordinary care.88
The standard, "honestly believes," on its face suggests both an
objective and subjective component. Subjectively, one must "believe" that
the action is in the best interests of the corporation. Objectively, one's
belief must be "honestly" held. 89 By using the word "honestly" instead of
"reasonably," the legislature relaxes the objective standard applied to
fiduciaries when they make discrete decisions, suggesting with some force
a gross negligence standard. Restated, one should not be considered
"honestly" to believe that an action is in the best interests of the corporation
if that belief is so unreasonable as to amount to an extreme deviation from
ordinary care.
Looking beyond Kentucky decisions, both Van Gorkom and the
Principles of Corporate Governance provide some insight into the
appropriate interpretation of the requirement that fiduciaries "honestly
believe" their decisions or actions benefit the corporation. Both of these
sources suggest that Kentucky's "honestly believe" standard is best
understood as the functional equivalent of gross negligence. The Van
Gorkom court, at different points in the opinion, in fact uses both "honest
belief' and "gross negligence" to describe the duties of fiduciaries at the
decisionmaking stage.9° This suggests, then, that the Van Gorkom court
considers the two different terms to be functional equivalents.
The Principles of Corporate Governance opts for a "rationally
believes" standard at the decisionmaking stage.9' On its face, this
articulation also seems functionally equivalent to a gross negligence
standard and Kentucky's "honestly believes" standard, and the comments
to the Principles support this conclusion.92 The comments expressly
recognize that the "rationally believes" standard is less rigorous than
negligence and defend the appropriateness of this more relaxed standard on
the basis of the "[s]ound public policy" of according the managers "greater
8 See supra note 62.
89 This is identical to the explanation offered in the Comments to the Principles of
Corporate Governance for the term "rationally believes." See the discussion infra at note
93-95 and accompanying text. The Comments to the Principles explain the "rationally
believes" standard as containing both a subjective component-the manager "must actually
believe" the action is best for the company-and an objective component-the manager's
belief "must be rational." PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) cmt. f.
90 See supra note 60.
9' PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c).
92 Id. cmt. f.
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protection" than they would get under a negligence standard.93 At the same
time the comments reject a purely subjective interpretation of the
"rationally believes" standard because it "provide[s] too much legal
insulation for directors and officers."94 Thus, the "rationally believes"
standard requires more culpability than mere simple negligence but is not
predicated on subjective knowledge. This seems, therefore, to be
functionally equivalent to a gross negligence or "honestly believes"
standard.95
An economic analysis also supports interpreting Kentucky's "honestly
believes" standard as the equivalent of gross negligence.96 It is easy to
imagine that the parties to the fiduciary duty "contract" (i.e., corporate
managers and shareholders) would opt for a gross negligence, or "extreme
deviation from ordinary care," standard at the decisionmaking stage. While
shareholders may prefer a negligence standard, rational managers would
charge a higher fee to operate under such a tough standard, and
shareholders may well conclude that the additional protection they receive
from the higher standard is not worth the cost. On the other hand,
shareholders probably would be willing to pay for more care than they
would receive under a purely subjective standard. In short, a gross
negligence standard seems to be an efficient term since it approximates the
term the parties would select.
Kentucky courts, when offered the opportunity to interpret and apply
its business judgment statutes, should equate "honestly believes" to gross
negligence or recklessness. This interpretation is consistent with the words
of the statutes and supported by persuasive authority and sound logic.
ii. Failure to Meet the Predicates of Kentucky's Business Judgment
Statute
One interpretative issue that has been resolved poorly by courts outside
Kentucky involves the question of what happens when a plaintiff is able to
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 In attempting to explain the meaning of the "rationally believes" criterion, the
comment provides additional support for this conclusion by suggesting the "rationally
believes" standard would not be met if the decision is "so removed from the realm of reason
that it should not be sustained." Id.
96 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text for a brief description of the economic
analysis of corporate fiduciary duties.
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show that the corporate fiduciary failed to meet any of the predicates of the
business judgment standard.97
The most typical situation involves a failure of the fiduciary-defendant
to meet the obligation to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the proposed
corporate action. When this happens, the fiduciary-defendant is denied the
protection of the forgiving "gross negligence" (or "honestly believes" or
"rationally believes") standard at the decisionmaking stage and, instead, is
subjected to the rigorous intrinsic fairness evaluation, in which the
fiduciary-defendant has the burden of proving that the transaction was fair
to the plaintiffs.
This approach was articulated in the Cede case, where a Delaware court
concluded that Technicolor's directors "failed to inform themselves fully
concerning all material information reasonably available prior to approving
the merger agreement.""8 The court concluded that because the directors
"breached... one of the triads of their fiduciary duty-good faith, loyalty
or due care ... the burden shifts to the [defendant directors] ... to prove
to the trier of fact the 'entire fairness' of the transaction." 99
The Kentucky statute does not suggest this approach, and it would be
unsound as a matter of policy for the courts to adopt this complicated,
convoluted, and circuitous procedure. Instead, the Kentucky statute
sensibly suggests that a failure to meet any of the three elements of the
statute-good faith, reasonable inquiry, or an honest belief that the decision
is in the best interests of the corporation-converts the case into a matter
of remedy or damages.' The elements are held together in the statute by
the conjunctive "and,"'' which suggests that each element independently
is required by and equally important to the business judgment duties of the
fiduciary. The logical implication of the statutory language, therefore, is
that any harm resulting from the failure to comply with any of the three
should produce a remedy for complaining shareholders. This direct and
logical approach will help simplify and expedite fiduciary duty litigation
and will properly focus the court on the construction of remedies that are
appropriate to protect the interests of shareholders and of society.
" See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) ("If the
rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the defendant... to prove.., the 'entire fairness' of the
transaction."), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
9
' Id. at 371.
99 Id. at 361.
'00 See K.R.S. § 271B.8-300(5) (Banks-Baldwin 2004).
'0' §§ 271B.300(1), 271B.8-420(1).
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iii. Kentucky's Limitation on Monetary Damages
Kentucky statutes impose an additional hurdle on one important
remedy that shareholders may seek against officers and directors who
violate their fiduciary duties. Under the Kentucky statutes, a recovery of
"monetary damages" against directors or officers who violate their
fiduciary duties is predicated on a finding that the director's or officer's
actions "constitute[] willful misconduct or wanton or reckless disregard for
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders."' 102
This statute applies only to the matter of monetary recovery against
fiduciaries who violate their fiduciary duties; it does not, therefore, change
Kentucky's business judgment standard as such or insulate Kentucky
directors or officers from other shareholder remedies.
Although this statute appears to be designed to make it more difficult
to collect monetary damages against corporate managers, a close analysis
shows that it likely has little impact on directors and officers at the
decisionmaking stage. As described above, Kentucky's business judgment
statutes subject directors and officers to an "honestly believes" standard
when they make decisions," 3 and that "honestly believes" standard should
be considered the functional equivalent of the "reckless disregard" standard
that is the statutory predicate to monetary recovery.' 4
On the other hand, this statute may well have an impact on the ability
to obtain monetary damages for failures by fiduciaries at the investigation
stage. Under Kentucky's business judgment statutes, a manager fails the
business judgment test if he fails to make inquiry "with the care an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances."' ' The statute limiting monetary damages, however,
insulates managers from monetary liability unless the failure to inquire is
so extreme as to amount to a "reckless disregard for the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders."' In short, while a negligent investiga-
tion violates the manager's fiduciary duty under Kentucky's business
judgment law, the manager is not liable for monetary damages unless the
investigation is so poorly done that it amounts to an extreme departure from
102 § 271 B.8-300(5)(b) (providing for monetary damages against directors); see also
§ 271B.8-420(5)(b) (providing for monetary damages against officers). The two sections use
identical language.
03 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
104 See discussion supra note 78.




ordinary care."0 7 As stated above, however, courts would be free-indeed,
obligated-to construct non-monetary remedies on behalf of shareholders
who are able to demonstrate that officers or directors harmed them or the
corporation as a result of a negligent inquiry.
iv. Standard of Care or Standard of Review?
For some time, Delaware courts deciding business judgment cases have
defined their role in terms of applying a scope of review,' as opposed to
evaluating compliance with a standard of conduct imposed by society. If
this initial statement seems confusing, further explanation of the interplay
between these concepts only makes it more so.
In a note in his widely adopted casebook, Professor Eisenberg explains
this approach. He first defines a "standard of conduct" as a rule defining
"how an actor should conduct a given activity or play a given role."' 09 In all
duty-of-care cases, Professor Eisenberg states that the standard of care is
reasonableness. Restating this standard of care in the negative, directors
owe the duty not to act negligently or unreasonably in regard to their
functions as directors. Eisenberg defines a "standard of review," on the
other hand, as "the test a court should apply when it reviews an actor's
conduct to determine whether to impose liability or grant injunctive
relief." tO
He then explains the business judgment rule as a standard of review
concept-a doctrine that determines under what conditions and to what
extent courts will review the discrete decisions made by corporate boards.
Applying this concept, if in making a discrete decision a director "informed
himself.., to the extent he reasonably believes appropriate," acts in "good
faith" and has no "financial interest in the subject matter of the decision,"
then "the quality of a directors' decision will be reviewed [by a court], not
to determine whether the decision was reasonable, but only under a much
more limited standard," which Eisenberg suggests is a "rational"
standard. "'
, 7 For a discussion of "recklessness" as an "extreme departure" from ordinary care,"
see supra note 67.
10 See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003)
(characterizing the business judgment rule as "a standard of judicial review") (citing MM
Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003)).
'09 EISENBERG, supra note 21, at 544.
O110 d.
"' id. at 546. This "rational" standard seems to be the functional equivalent of gross
negligence or honestly believes. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey of the Supreme Court of Delaware
explained all of this in terms of aspirations and liability. The negligence
standard of conduct, he says, is "aspirational," which apparently means that
it is the standard to which society believes corporate fiduciaries should
aspire. The gross negligence (or "rationally believes" or "honestly
believes") standard of review, on the other hand, is the standard that will
be applied by courts when they are asked to determine whether fiduciaries
should have any liability for acts that cause harm to the corporation.' 12
Generally, however, society attempts to reach an aspirational goal by
making that goal mandatory and providing an economic incentive for
people to live up to that goal or standard.' 13 If we want motorists to drive
thirty-five miles per hour in a school zone, we set the speed limit at that
speed and fine people who violate the speed limit.'14 Enforcing a
sub-optimal standard makes sense only if the additional costs associated
with enforcing the optimal (or aspirational) standard exceed the benefits
that society garners from enforcing the higher, optimal (aspirational)
standard as compared to the lower, sub-optimal standard.
Considering both the cost and the benefit, it is hard to imagine how
society could gain by enforcing a sub-optimal duty-of-care standard. The
difference in economic costs between enforcing a negligence duty-of-care
standard and a recklessness duty-of-care standard seems to be
negligible. 15 If, therefore, enforcement costs are roughly the same, society
should opt in favor of the standard that produces the highest benefit, which
Justice Veasey and Professor Eisenberg both seem to assume is a
112 See "Corporate Governance Principles Emerge in Environment of 'Competitive
Federalism,"' Fed. Sec. Rep. Letter (CCH) (Feb. 4, 2004), available at http://business.
cch.com/securitieslaw/news/2 -404.asp.
113 In the tort area, for example, law and economics scholars discuss a negligence
regime of tort recovery in terms of damages set at a level that will encourage efficient
investment in accident reduction. Typically, law and economics scholars believe that
recovery for full economic loss promotes economic efficiency. The threat of damages at that
level will encourage potential tortfeasors to make the necessary investments and conduct
alterations to avoid committing inefficient accidents. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OFLAW 192-200 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing the economic theory of tort damages).
114 See ic at 219-27 (discussing the use of fines as efficient criminal sanctions).
115 Society's out of pocket costs in administering the standards appear to be the same.
Also, there is no reason to expect significant differences in other economic costs, such as the
economic costs associated with overdeterrence. See id. at 221 (discussing the economic costs
that result when overly excessive penalties cause citizens "to forgo socially desirable
activities at the borderline of" the prohibited activity, as a way to establish a safety buffer
against inadvertent violation of the law).
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negligence standard." 6 Thus, not only is the Delaware standard of review
approach confusing and complex and based on a false analogy," 7 but the
approach also amounts to bad policy. d
The Kentucky business judgment statutes seem clear on this matter:
Kentucky has established as a standard of care a duty on the part of
fiduciaries to act reasonably at the inquiry stage and a duty of care at the
decisionmaking stage to act in a manner that does not amount to gross
negligence. There is no basis in sound policy or in Kentucky law for a
resort to the confusing and misdirected standard of review analysis adopted
by Delaware.
b. Deeply Conflicted Discrete Decisions
It seems highly likely that Kentucky courts, like the courts of Delaware,
would apply an intrinsic fairness test to evaluate the propriety of deeply
conflicted actions taken by corporate fiduciaries."' While the law on this
matter is not without some ambiguity, Kentucky statutes and cases and
sound policy support an intrinsic fairness standard in conflicted situations.
16 This should not be read as an endorsement of a negligence standard of care. In fact,
my own view is that a gross negligence standard at decisionmaking may amount to an
efficient term that is entirely appropriate as an economic and fairness matter. The point here
is that the determination should be approached as a direct standard of care issue and should
not be confused or misdirected by a standard of review analysis.
. Typically, courts apply standard of review concepts to their review of the decisions
of lower courts or administrative agencies. Considering, for example, a court's review of an
administrative agency's decision, sound reasons exist for the court's deference to the
judgment made by the agency. The agency is viewed as independent (unconflicted) and an
expert in its area. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
434-523 (1993) (discussing judicial review of administrative decisions); Michael P. Healy,
Spurious Interpretation Redux: Mead and the Shrinking Domain of Statutory Ambiguity, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 673 (2002) (discussing deference courts pay to administrative decisions in
the face of ambiguous legislative delegations of authority to the agency). It is impossible to
imagine that all (or perhaps even most) directors' decisions are made in circumstances where
directors are truly unconflicted experts regarding the particular decision.
t Two cases in Kentucky may provide some guidance regarding the circumstances in
which fiduciaries are considered "conflicted." In Security Trust Co. v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d
401(Ky. 1963), a director of a company to be acquired was not considered to be conflicted
when he voted in favor of the acquisition, even though he was to continue as a director
following the acquisition. The Kentucky Court of Appeals wrote that "we do not believe that
the mere obtention of a directorship on the board following merger or consolidation creates
a disqualifying self-interest." Id. at 406. The court in Brewer v. Lincoln International
Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 792 (W.D. Ky. 2000), on the other hand, found a troubling conflict
in a case in which a director of a company to be acquired had a significant property interest
in the acquiring company and had been assured of his continuation as an officer following
the acquisition. See id.
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Three Kentucky statutes must be considered here. First is a Kentucky
statute that protects a deeply conflicted transaction from voidability if the
transaction is approved by a prescribed shareholder or director vote, or if
the transaction is fair." 9 This statute, however, deals only with the
enforceability of the terms of such a transaction, preventing, for example,
either the corporation or the deeply conflicted fiduciary from failing to live
up to the contractual terms of the transaction. The statute does not,
therefore, speak directly on the matter of the appropriate standard for
fiduciaries involved in deeply conflicted actions. 2
The other statutes to be considered are Kentucky's business judgment
statutes, described in the preceding section. These statutes subj ect directors
and officers to an overall good faith obligation and require that they act
reasonably at the investigation stage and consistent with a more relaxed
"honestly believes" standard at the decisionmaking stage. The statutes on
their faces do not distinguish between conflicted and non-conflicted
transactions, leaving open the possibility that these statutes could be
applied to deeply conflicted transactions.
There are compelling reasons, however, to limit Kentucky's statutory
business judgment standard to situations in which non-conflicted
fiduciaries make discrete decisions on behalf of their corporations. Perhaps
most importantly, applying a business judgment standard to conflicted
fiduciary actions would be inconsistent with long-established standards of
Kentucky common law, standards that were in place at the time the present
Kentucky business judgment statutes were enacted in 1988. For decades,
Kentucky courts have drawn distinctions between the duties owed by
conflicted fiduciaries, on the one hand, and non-conflicted fiduciaries on
the other.' 2 1 In cases involving non-conflicted actions, the language from
Kentucky cases suggests a substantive standard that is strongly deferential
"9 K.R.S. § 271B.8-310 (Banks-Baldwin 2004). The statute states that a director's
"conflict of interest transaction shall not be voidable by the corporation solely because of
the director's interest in the transactions" if the transaction is approved by shareholders or
directors, or if the transaction is "fair to the corporation." Id.
More recent versions of the Model Business Corporation Act appear to move this
provision more into the area of a fiduciary standard. See MODEL BusINESS CORPORATION
ACT § 8.61(b) (1991) ("A director's conflicting interest transaction may not ... give rise to
an award of damages" if the transaction is approved by directors or shareholders, or is fair)
(emphasis added).
20 By protecting against voidability when the transaction is "fair to the corporation,"
however, the statute suggests fairness as an appropriate standard against which to measure
the propriety of directors' actions. K.R.S. § 27 LB.8-3 10.
121 See, e.g., Allied Ready Mix Co. v. Allen, 994 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. App. 1999) (applying
different standards in judging propriety of conduct of special litigation committee and board,
depending on whether demand was made or excused).
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to corporate managers regarding the propriety of their actions12 and, in
such cases, courts assign the burden of proof to the plaintiffs. 123 On the
other hand, when corporate fiduciaries act in conflicted settings, Kentucky
courts have been willing to enhance the substantive standard and reassign
the burden of proof to, the conflicted fiduciaries. 124  These
policies-enhancing the standard and reversing the burden of proof in
conflicted decisions-are the essence of the intrinsic fairness test.
25
Because the Kentucky business judgment statutes do not amount to
clear legislative authorization for abandonment of Kentucky's traditional
position, Kentucky courts should continue to apply more rigorous standards
in deeply conflicted cases. 126 It seems unlikely that the Kentucky legislature
meant those statutes to abandon the well established Kentucky position of
122 See, e.g., Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. 105, 116-17 (W.D. Ky. 1951) (applying
Kentucky law) (stating that "directors are not liable to their corporation unless they are guilty
of actual or constructive fraud," and defining fraud as including conflicted decisions); Venus
Oil Corp. v. Gardner, 50 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Ky. 1932) ("The court may not intervene or
interfere in the internal affairs of a corporation.., unless its governing authorities... act
fraudulently, in the broad sense... or have abused the implied trust reposed in officers and
directors in such manner or to such extent as to warrant the interposition of equity.");
Haldeman v. Haldeman, 197 S.W. 376, 381 (Ky. 1917) ("The courts will not interfere with
this management confided in the officers of the corporation so long as it keeps within the
limits of its charter, and does not act fraudulently."); Poutch v. Nat'l Foundry & Mach. Co.,
143 S.W. 1003, 1004 (Ky. 1912) ("[The] general rule is that the action of the directors must
be a fraud on the corporation, actually or constructively, before the directors can be held
liable.").
123 See, e.g., Venus Oil Corp., 50 S.W.2d at 538 (placing the "burden ... upon the
objecting stockholders to establish" a fiduciary violation).
i24 Levitan, 97 F. Supp. at 117 (holding that when a fiduciary is "in a position of
conflict . . . courts will examine carefully into the results of the act and will hold the
fiduciary liable if, despite his good intentions, his act resulted in injury"); see also Enter.
Foundry & Mach. Works v. Miners' Elkhorn Coal Co., 45 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Ky. 1931):
When the directors deal with themselves in such a transaction, they are acting
in a dual capacity.... The presumption is unfavorable to them, and upon their acts
being called in question . . . the burden is imposed upon them to show by a
preponderance of proof that they acted bona fide and that the corporation got the
benefit of their act.
Id.; Beha v. Martin, 171 S.W. 393, 395 (Ky. 1914) ("[T~he affirmance or adoption [of the
conflicted transaction] must not be brought about by unfair or improper means."); Poutch,
143- S.W. at 1004 ("[When] directors act in their own interest... the burden of proof is on
them to show the fairness of the transaction.").
.25 See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
126 Even assuming the general applicability of the Kentucky business judgment statutes,
a court could conclude that the obligation under the statutes to exercise "good faith" is not
met when a conflicted fiduciary acts unfairly toward his corporation. Alternatively, a court
could find that the fiduciary's duty to "honestly believe" that a transaction is in the best




according enhanced protections to shareholders who are subjected to
deeply conflicted actions by their corporate fiduciaries. 
127
Applying a common law intrinsic fairness standard to conflicted
transactions also would put Kentucky in line with her sister states-most
notably Delaware"2 -and amount to sound policy. Conflicted fiduciaries
need strong incentives to act in a manner that is consistent with society's
expectations and the expectations of the corporation's owners. By shifting
the burden to managers and enhancing the substantive standard to fairness,
and then enforcing these enhanced obligations through the threat of
judicially imposed remedies, conflicted managers are strongly and
appropriately encouraged to pursue the best interests of the company's
owners.
A related economic argument also suggests the need for an intrinsic
fairness standard in conflicted transactions. As described earlier,
economists often defend the propriety of an outcome by reference to the
agreement that the parties would reach, if they were able to bargain with
one another. The idea is simple, logical, and morally attractive, since it is
based on the notion of consent." 9 Applied in the case of managers'
fiduciary duties in conflicted transactions, one can reasonably conclude that
owners would likely demand and be willing to pay for more protection in
the form of higher fiduciary standards. In conflicted transactions, the risks
for the owners are greater than in the case of non-conflicted transactions,
and it makes economic sense to assume that owners would pay more to
eliminate the higher risk. For courts to apply an intrinsic fairness standard
in such situations, therefore, may approximate the bargain that owners and
managers would make in such conflicted situations.
In summary, one should expect Kentucky to continue, as it has in the
past, to apply an intrinsic fairness standard to conflicted actions by
corporate fiduciaries. This approach would be consistent with Kentucky
statutes, cases, and precedents from other jurisdictions, and with sound
policy.
"27 Although operating under prior corporate statutes, Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service
Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991), and Aero Drapery of Kentucky, Inc. v. Engdahl, 507
S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1974), are cases in which the Supreme Court of Kentucky appeared to
resort to a common law version of fiduciary duties that was higher than, or at least somewhat
more expansive of, the duties articulated in the statute. These cases, therefore, may support
a view that the fiduciary duty statutes should be supplemented by the common law.
12 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
129 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
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c. Quasi-Conflicted Decisions ("Specter" of a Conflict)30
Although they have never considered the matter, I expect Kentucky
courts to adopt the proportionality test as the fiduciary standard applicable
to discrete decisions made by quasi-conflicted corporate managers. Under
this test, which amounts to a middle ground between businessjudgment and
intrinsic fairness, managers (defendants) have the burden of proving the
reasonableness of their investigation and the reasonableness of their actual
decision. 3' Delaware courts have applied the proportionality test to actions
taken by directors of a target when they deployed defensive tactics in
response to an unsolicited bid for the target."'
Once again, courts should not infer that Kentucky's business judgment
statutes foreclose the adoption of a proportionality test for quasi-conflicted
management actions. It seems highly unlikely that the Kentucky legislature,
in enacting the business judgment statutes, intended to abandon Kentucky's
long-standing common-aw tradition of according shareholders enhanced
and meaningful protection from managers' conflicted actions.'33 Absent a
clear legislative directive, courts should be reluctant to expand the scope
of Kentucky's business judgment statutes into the area of conflicted
actions-even quasi-conflicted actions.'34
Adopting a proportionality test for quasi-conflicted situations is a
sensible implementation of Kentucky's common-law tradition. In any given
case, the depth of conflict faced by corporate fiduciaries might be anywhere
from a very deeply conflicted transaction to a completely non-conflicted
transaction. Two discrete bins--deeply conflicted and non-conflicted-do
not, therefore, effectively accommodate the gradations of conflict within
which fiduciaries may find themselves. This is the basis for the
proportionality test. It offers courts an appropriate analytical framework for
deciding cases in which fiduciaries are conflicted, but less so than in deeply
conflicted cases, such as Weinberger, where directors who were nominees
of the majority shareholder facilitated the freezeout of minority
o In Revlon, the Delaware court characterized the situation in which a target board is
faced with an unsolicited bid for their company as involving the board in a "specter" of a
conflict. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1985).
In this paper, I sometimes refer to this as a "quasi-conflict" since the situation lies between
a deeply conflicted and a non-conflicted situation.
"' See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
132 Revlon is an example of this. For a discussion of Revlon, see supra notes 71-77 and
accompanying text.
1 See supra note 78.
3 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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shareholders,13 or Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas and Electric, 136 where
a director personally purchased electricity from his corporation.
The proportionality test, therefore, tailors fiduciary duties more closely
to the nature and depth of the fiduciary's conflict. It is consistent with the
common sense notion of imposing tougher fiduciary standards on corporate
managers only to the extent necessary to protect shareholders from the
pressures created by managers' self-interest.
The proportionality test is once again consistent with sound economic
policy because it approximates the level of fiduciary protection that the
parties would select if they were able to bargain with each other.'37
Corporate shareholders, if able to bargain effectively with their managers
about the nature and extent of the managers' fiduciary duties, would be
inclined to tailor their purchases of fiduciary protection for their own
economic benefit. Shareholders would, in other words, be unwilling to pay
for fiduciary protection in excess of the minimum amount necessary to
protect themselves in particular situations. Applied here, shareholders
considering a quasi-conflicted situation would be unwilling to pay for the
extreme level of fiduciary protection they demand in a deeply conflicted
situation. If able to bargain, one should expect the parties-managers and
shareholders-to agree on an intermediate level of fiduciary protection to
cover quasi-conflicted situations. Thus, the proportionality test appears to
be an efficient rule upon which rational parties might agree.
The proportionality test grew out of cases in which company directors
took actions to ward off an unsolicited takeover bid for their company.
Recently, Delaware courts have suggested an expanded applicability of the
proportionality test, applying the standard to deal protection provisions that
were part of a friendly acquisition.'
See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
136 Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas and Elec. Co., 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918).
137 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
'38 In Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003), the court
expanded the applicability of the proportionality test beyond the context of contested
acquisitions. In Omnicare, the board of NCS, the target of a friendly acquisition by Genesis
Health Ventures, Inc., agreed to certain contractual provisions that made it essentially
impossible for other bidders to compete for the acquisition ofNCS. Even though at the time
no other bidders were on the scene, and thus the acquisition was entirely friendly, the court
refused to apply a business judgment standard, opting instead for the proportionality test to
evaluate the propriety of the action ofNCS's board. The court stated that "defensive devices
adopted by the board to protect the original merger transaction must withstand enhanced
judicial scrutiny under the Unocal standard of review [i.e., proportionality test], even when
that merger transaction does not result in a change of control." Id. at 93 1.
Since the proportionality test has been reserved for instances in which a quasi-conflict
is present (a "specter" of a conflict), the court explained the conflict it found in this friendly
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Generally, expanding the applicability of the proportionality test makes
perfect sense, and Kentucky courts should resort to this intermediate level
of fiduciary duties any time they find that a manager's action is conflicted,
but not deeply so. A number of examples come readily to mind. Executive
compensation, which traditionally has been evaluated under business
judgment, 39 may be an appropriate area for proportionality treatment. The
influence of the CEO on her board may raise the "specter" of a conflict at
least as deep as the conflict boards face in acquisitions. Kentucky courts
should evaluate executive compensation by placing the burden on the board
to establish that they acted reasonably at the investigation stage and at the
decision stage.140
Similarly, decisions involving the rights of non-voting preferred
shareholders may also call for proportionality treatment. Board members
owe fiduciary duties to preferred shareholders, but are elected by common
shareholders. 141 Decisions that have an impact on preferred shareholders-a
classic example would be the decision to withhold non-cumulative
preferred dividends 42-similarly raise a specter of a conflict that seems as
deep as that found in acquisition cases.
In summary, the proportionality test is a fundamentally sound approach
that finds support in Kentucky common-law traditions, is consistent with
Kentucky statutes, and leads to outcomes that are sound as a matter of
policy and economics. One should expect that Kentucky courts, when
situation:
There are inherent conflicts between a board's interest in protecting a merger
transaction it has approved, the stockholders' statutory right to make the final
decision to either approve or not approve a merger, and the board's continuing
responsibility to effectively exercise its fiduciary duties at all times after the
merger agreement is executed.
Id. at 930. Omnicare may signal, therefore, an expanded use of the proportionality test and
an expanded view of instances in which managers are faced with quasi-conflicts.
"' See, e.g., Douglas C. Michael, The Corporate Officer's Independent Duty as a Tonic
for the Anemic Law of Executive Compensation, 17 J. CoRP. L. 785, 803-04 (1992)
(providing background on the historical tests used by courts in reviewing executive
compensation).
140 With regard to directors setting their own salaries, one old Kentucky case appears
to apply the equivalent of an intrinsic fairness test. See Poutch v. Nat'l Foundry & Mach.
Co., 143 S.W. 1003, 1004 (Ky. 1912) ("IT]he presumption is that directors act in their own
interest... [when they vote a salary to themselves], and that the burden of proof is on them
to show the fairness of the transaction.").
141 See Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. 1986) (describing
the distinctions between duties owed to preferred as compared to common stockholders).
142 For examples of this issue, see Sanders v. Cuba R.R. Co., 120 A.2d 849 (N.J. 1956)
(applying the dividend credit rule), and Guttmann v. Illinois CentralR.R. Co., 189 F.2d 927
(2d Cir. 1951) (rejecting the dividend credit rule).
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offered the chance, will adopt the standard and will look for appropriate
opportunities to expand the use of the proportionality test.
d Final Overview
Considering Kentucky statutes and common law together, one could
conclude that Kentucky's corporate fiduciary standards applicable to
discrete actions taken by corporate managers will be determined by the
existence and depth of any conflict of interest within which the fiduciary
finds himself. One should expect, therefore, that Kentucky courts, when
asked to evaluate the propriety of managers' actions, will apply the
business judgment test to non-conflicted actions, the intrinsic fairness test
to deeply conflicted transactions, and the proportionality test to conflicted
transactions. While it is possible to find some language to the contrary in
Kentucky cases, generally those cases are not only confusing and poorly
reasoned but also are old, pre-dating Kentucky's more recent statutes and
the modem development of fiduciary concepts generally.'43 The language
from those old cases should not be taken seriously.
C. Fiduciary Duties Applied to Monitoring
The duties as described in the immediately preceding section apply to
discrete decisions made on behalf of corporations by their managers.
Managers, however, and particularly boards of directors, also owe the duty
to monitor the activities and the agents of the corporation.'"4 These
143 See, e.g., Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. 105, 116-17 (W.D. Ky. 1951) (indicating that
in non-conflicted situations, fiduciaries are liable only for actual fraud); Sec. Trust Co. v.
Dabney, 372 S.W.2d 401, 406 (Ky. 1963) ("Absent fraud, actual or constructive, the courts
will not interfere with the management of a private corporation."); Taylor v. Axton-Fischer
Tobacco Co., 173 S.W.2d 377, 378 (Ky. 1943) ("It is fundamental and elemental that the
action of directors when exercised in good faith and not in fraud of the rights of the
stockholders is not subject to their control and will not be interfered with by the courts.");
Mfrs.' Land & Improvement Co. v. Cleary, 89 S.W. 248, 249 (Ky. 1905) ("The judgment
or discretion of the governing body, usually a board of directors, as to matters intra vires, is
entirely beyond the control of the stockholders through the intervention of the courts, except
for frauds committed or threatened against the corporation or the minority stockholders.").
All the foregoing suggests, incorrectly under today's law, that managers are liable only for
fraud.
' Although monitoring is normally considered in regard to directors' obligation to
monitor senior officers, senior officers, in turn, also have a duty to monitor junior officers
and employees. In the old case of Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920), for example,
Dresser, the president of a bank, was held to have failed in his duty to monitor an employee,




obligations have recently received intense scrutiny in the wake of massive
corporate failures such as those of Enron and WorldCom.
145
1. The Law Generally
Corporate managers are typically held to a reasonable, person standard
with regard to their obligation to monitor the affairs of the corporation.'46
The business judgment rule, with its relaxed standards, is applied only with
regard to discrete decisions made by corporate managers. 147 A comment to
the Principles of Corporate Governance states: "There is... no reason to
provide special protection [for corporate fiduciaries] where no business
decisionmaking is to be, found. If ... directors have failed to oversee the
conduct of the corporation's business[,] . .. business judgment rule
protection [for directors] would be manifestly undesirable."' 48
Francis v. United Jersey Bank'49 is a good example of a monitoring
case. Lillian G. Prichard was a director of a company from which her sons,
who were senior officers in the company, misappropriated a large amount
of money. In evaluating whether Mrs. Prichard had fulfilled her monitoring
duties to the corporation, the court applied a negligence standard. The court
concluded that she had not performed at a reasonable level, notwithstanding
that she was old, unsophisticated, physically incapacitated and had "started
to drink rather heavily."'5' The court found that she "knew virtually
nothing" about the company's business, "visited the corporate officers
• .. on only one occasion,'' "never read or obtained the annual financial
statements," Was "unfamiliar with the rudiments" of the company's
145 While the focus of this paper is on state-law fiduciary duties, the national stock
exchanges and the Nasdaq have emerged as significant rule makers respecting the obligation
of directors to act as meaningful monitors on the conduct of corporate managers. See, e.g.,
The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc. Marketplace Rule 4350(c) (April 15, 2004), available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/corporategovernance.pdf (listing standards requiring 1) a
majority of the directors to be independent; 2) CEO compensation to be recommended or
determined by a majority of independent directors or an independent compensation
committee; and 3) director nominees to be recommended or determined by a majority of
independent directors or an independent nominating committee).
146 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 4.0 1(a) ("A director or officer has
a dty... [to act in a way] that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation.") (emphasis added).
147 See id.
14S Id. § 4.0 1(c) cmt. c. In the famous Delaware case Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
813 (Del. 1984), the court stated that "the business judgment rule operates only in the
contet of director action.... [I]t has no role where directors have either abdicated their
functions, or absent conscious decision, failed to act." Id.




business, and "made no effort to assure that policies of the
corporation... pertaining to withdrawal of funds[] complied with industry
custom or relevant law."'5' In short, the court found that she "did not pay
any attention to her duties as a director or to the affairs of the corporation."
These facts led the court to conclude that she failed to meet her duty to
monitor reasonably.' 2
2. Kentucky Law
Although Kentucky case law is thin, it offers at least modest support
for imposing a higher standard of care in monitoring cases than in cases
involving discrete actions by fiduciaries.'" Somewhat surprisingly,
Kentucky's business judgment statutes'54 also support a higher, pure
negligence standard with regard to the monitoring obligations of fiduciaries
in Kentucky corporations. A close reading suggests that the reasonable
inquiry obligation required by those Kentucky statutes is applicable both
to the monitoring function and to discrete decisionmaking cases, while the
more relaxed "honestly believes" standard is available only at the discrete
decisionmaking stage.
Considering the language more specifically, the Kentucky statutes
require a corporate fiduciary in "the discharge of his duties" to act "[o]n an
informed basis."' 55 Since these "duties" include both monitoring and
discrete decisionmaking, the obligation to act on an "informed basis" would
seem to apply to both aspects of the fiduciaries' duties. The statutes then
define "informed basis" as requiring a reasonable "inquiry into the business
and affairs of the corporation or into a particular action to be taken .... ,,5
Once again, the first part of that language-the duty to make reasonable
I1 1d. at 819.
i52 Id. Another example of a culpable failure to monitor can be found in the Principles
of Corporate Governance: "[A] director received but did not read basic financial information
over a period of time, and thus allowed his corporation to be looted." PRINCIPLES OF CORP.
GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) cmt. c (1992).
153 In Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Ky. 1951), a federal court applying
Kentucky law articulated an exceedingly lax fiduciary standard applying to actions of
directors, but then recognized that directors also have been held liable for "losses resuljing
from their lack of attention to its affairs." Id. at 116. This seems to recognize the distinction
between monitoring and discrete decisionmaking and at least to suggest a more rigorous
standard for monitoring.
154 K.R.S. § 271B.8-300 (Banks-Baldwin 2004) (defining the duties of directors);
§ 271B.8-420 (defining the duties of corporate officers). The language of these statutes is
identical.
m §§ 271B.8-300(1), .8-420(1).
'5 §§ 271B.8-300(2), .8-420(2).
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"inquiry into the business and affairs of the corporation"-appears to be
aimed directly at the monitoring function.
If, therefore, one takes this language and imagines a Kentucky case
similar to Francis-a case in which a director's negligent inattention
enabled officers to loot and steal from the corporation-the language of the
Kentucky statutes suggests that directors would have violated their
fiduciary duty under Kentucky law, even if such monitoring were not so
poor as to amount to gross negligence.
One should expect that Kentucky courts will confirm a strict reasonable
person standard for managers' monitoring obligations. As I write, the
landscape is littered with companies that failed in part due to poor
monitoring. While federal rule makers have responded with laws and
regulations-such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,' Securities and Exchange
Commission regulations implementing Sarbanes-Oxley,"' and enhanced
listing standards from the national securities exchanges and
Nasdaq'g--state corporate fiduciary standards are still important vehicles
for ensuring that corporate fiduciaries live up to society's expectations. It
thus seems unlikely that Kentucky courts would be inclined to compromise
a strict standard regarding this most important fiduciary function.
IV. PARTICULAR FIDUCIARY DUTY ISSUES UNDER KENTUCKY LAW
A. Disclosure Obligations
Accurate information is essential to the creation of economic wealth.
In the case of corporate decisionmakers, they must have accurate and timely
information to make wealth-maximizing decisions and to fulfill their
monitoring functions. Senior officers typically control the flow of
information to directors and shareholders. It is important, therefore, that
society's rules provide economic incentives for corporate officers and
managers to make appropriate disclosures of material corporate
information.
The obligation of corporate fiduciaries to disclose important
information may seem primarily to implicate the antifraud provisions of
securities laws. Most apparent in that regard is Rule 10b-5 under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits manipulation or
15 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-24, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
..8 See, e.g., SEC Regulation S-B, 17 C.F.R. § 228.401 (2004) (requiring audit
committee financial expert).
1'9 See, e.g., NASDAQ Marketplace Rule 4350(c), supra note 145.
[VOL. 93
CoRpoRATE FtDucLARY DuTIEs
deception in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 6 A
disclosure obligation, however, is also an integral part of managers'
fiduciary duties.
Kentucky cases involving corporate fiduciary decisions properly
promulgate a strong version of the duty of corporate managers to disclose
information to boards of directors and shareholders. Language suggests that
the adequacy of disclosure will be measured under Kentucky's fiduciary
principles by a standard similar to the "materiality" standard' 6' used in
federal securities cases,'62 and that courts will take an expansive view of
what is included in the materiality standard. Kentucky's highest court, for
example, has spoken of the "duty to fully disclose" and declared that a
fiduciary "must lay bare the truth without ambiguity or reservation, in all
its stark significance."'
163
Considering, first, situations involving discrete corporate decisions that
are made either by directors or shareholders, Kentucky cases make clear
that managers who provide materially inaccurate or incomplete information
in connection with such discrete decisions violate their fiduciary
obligations. Brewer v. Lincoln International Corp. "6 is an example of such
a case. There, the plaintiffs, who were shareholders, alleged that managers
failed to disclose the value of the company's principal assets in connection
with an amendment to the company's articles of incorporation. Following
the amendment, plaintiffs were frozen out of the corporation at what was
alleged to be an unfairly low price. Essentially, the claim was that, if the
plaintiffs had known about the real value of the company's assets, they
would not have agreed to the amendment to the company's articles. This,
the court found, stated a valid claim for a breach of fiduciary duty.
165
160 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2004).
161 In a case involving co-tenants, a Kentucky court concluded that a fiduciary duty was
owed and that "such a relation imposes a duty to disclose material facts affecting that
interest." Foley v. Smith, No. 2003-CA-000621 -MR, 2004 WL 1102335, at *1 (Ky. Ct.
App. May 14, 2004) (emphasis added).
162 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,439 (1976) ("An omitted fact
[in a proxy solicitation] is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.").
163 Aero Drapery of Kentucky, Inc. v. Engdahl, 507 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Ky. 1974).
164 Brewer v. Lincoln Int'l Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 792 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
165 See id. at 813; see also Foley, 2004 WL 1102335. Although Foley involved joint
owners of real property, it supports the conclusion that a fiduciary duty requires disclosure
with respect to discrete decisions. The court found that co-tenants of real property owe one
another fiduciary duties. The co-tenants agreed to sell their jointly owned property to a
corporation controlled by one of the co-tenants, Smith. The other co-tenant, Foley, worked
for Smith's corporation and was fired after the sale of the jointly owned property was
completed. Foley later complained that he would not have agreed to the sale if he had known
that Smith was going to fire him and that Smith, as his fiduciary, owed him (Foley) the duty
2004-20051
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While there is nothing remarkable about a case like Brewer (and
certainly one would be surprised by a contrary outcome) the general rule
that fiduciaries are obligated to provide accurate and complete information
when corporate decisionmakers make discrete decisions is a very important
prophylactic. The rule provides an incentive to supply information
necessary for economically efficient decisions by boards of directors and
shareholders. To avoid violations of their fiduciary duties and any resulting
personal civil liability, senior managers have an economic incentive to
furnish boards with accurate, complete information, and boards have an
economic incentive to supply shareholders with the same.
This may have an especially broad impact on companies that are not
reporting under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.166 For example, the
failure of the board of a non-1934 Act company to disclose materially
negative information about a board nominee in its annual proxy solicitation
could violate the board's fiduciary duty to shareholders. Similarly, any
misstatement in the unaudited monthly financial information supplied by
the chief financial officer and the chief executive officer to the company's
board also could violate the fiduciary duties of those officers. Properly
understood, therefore, Kentucky's strong verison of the fiduciary duty of
disclosure can provide an economic incentive for improved corporate
decisionmaking.
In addition to making discrete decisions, both corporate boards of
directors and shareholders perform monitoring functions in the corporate
governance structure. Kentucky cases confirm a fiduciary duty on the part
of managers to provide corporate decisionmakers with the material
information necessary for them to perform their monitoring duties.
In Innes v. Howell Corp.,167 the Sixth Circuit concluded that a vice
president of a Kentucky corporation was "a fiduciary" and thus "was
required to disclose to the corporation any conflicts of interest" in
connection with transactions he undertook on behalf of the corporation. 6 '
In Aero Drapery of Kentucky, Inc. v. Engdahl,169 a fiduciary set up a
business in competition with his corporation. The court concluded that "it
[was] ... his duty to fully disclose these facts to the corporation," in large
to disclose Smith's intent to fire him. The court concluded that Smith breached his duty to
Foley by failing to disclose his intention of firing Foley. See id.
166 There are several exemptions to the reporting requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the most common of which are that companies with assets of less
than ten million dollars or 500 shareholders of record need not register with the SEC See,
e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2005).
167 limes v. Howell Corp., 76 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 1996).
1
6
1 See id. at 715.
169 Aero Drapery of Kentucky, Inc. v. Engdahl, 507 S.W.2d 166, 166 (Ky. 1974).
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part because he "knew of a forthcoming, simultaneous loss of key
employees."' 70 Innes and Aero Drapery are considered monitoring cases.
In each, the fiduciary violated a duty to supply the board with material
information necessary to monitor the conflicted situation in which the
fiduciary had placed himself. Conflicts, of course, are especially sensitive
situations and require intensified monitoring on behalf of the corporation.
Kentucky courts appropriately conclude that information flows are
important to efficient, well-run corporations. Because senior managers
control, to a very large degree, the information flows coming to the
corporate decisionmakers and monitors, Kentucky's expansive view of
"materiality" and its willingness to enforce a strong disclosure duty amount
to important weapons against corporate abuses. Kentucky courts rightly
conclude that managers must be made to feel the potential economic sting
of disclose failures.
B. Competition with the Corporation
A corporate fiduciary's competition with her corporation raises
difficult economic and policy issues. On the one hand, a fiduciary who
opens a new business that competes with her company increases
competition in the product market, which generally is thought to be
beneficial.'71 On the other hand, the threat of fiduciary competition makes
corporations reluctant to transfer information to the fiduciaries.72 and
reluctant to make human capital investments (training, for example) in their
top managers.' Without information transfers and human capital
investment, the corporation is less efficient. Optimal rules respecting
competition with the corporation, therefore, must accommodate these
competing economic and policy concerns.
Under Kentucky common law, corporate fiduciaries who engage in
direct, active competition with their corporation violate their fiduciary
duties unless a proper and unbiased corporate decisionmaker with
knowledge of all material facts waives the conflict. Aero Drapery'74 and
70 Id. at 169.
171 For example, stiff competition forces inefficient competitors out of the product
market and redeploys their assets into other areas.
'72 The natural fear, if the fiduciary is permitted the unfettered right to compete with her
corporation, is that the fiduciary will use the information in a new competitive business,
which will be harmful to the corporation.
'13 The fear is that the fiduciary will take her newly acquired human capital and use it
in a competitive corporation.
' Aero Drapery of Kentucky, Inc. v. Engdahl, 507 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1974).
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Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc. '75 are the leading cases in
this area, and each states a strong version of the general duty on the part of
corporate fiduciaries to avoid such conflicts. In Aero Drapery, the court
stated that corporate fiduciaries "cannot, while still a corporate fiduciary,
set up a competitive enterprise,"' 7 6 and in Steelvest the court stated that
"directors and officers . . . may not set up . . . an enterprise which is
competitive with the business in which the corporation is engaged while
still serving as directors and officers."' 77
The court in Aero Drapery also makes it clear that the corporation is
permitted to waive any competition conflict with its fiduciary. The court,
in considering whether the corporate fiduciary, Engdahl, had violated his
fiduciary duty to his corporation, stated that Engdahl's "fiduciary position
obligated him not to develop [conflicting business] interests ... withoutfull
disclosure."'5 This approach on the part of Kentucky courts is sound. It
essentially leaves it to the parties-the fiduciary and the corporation-to
work out the terms of their arrangements in a manner that suits themselves.
Effectively, however, it establishes a presumption that the parties generally
would agree to prohibit the fiduciary from engaging in direct competition
with the corporation.'79 Competition is permitted only if there is a showing
that the parties agreed to waive the general rule. Since there are no
significant externalities or third-party effects upon the arrangement
between the manager and her corporation,"O it seems entirely appropriate
175 Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991).
176 Aero Drapery, 507 S.W.2d at 169.
171 Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 483.
7 Aero Drapery, 507 S.W.2d at 169 (emphasis added).
171 Once it is recognized that the parties have the right to construct their own
arrangements, the matter becomes a classic gap filling exercise for the court. See POSNER,
supra note 113, at 93 98. "The task for a court asked to interpret a contract to cover a
contingency that the parties did not provide for is to imagine how the parties would have
provided for it had they thought to do so." Id. at 96. The court in Steelvest recognized its
role as that of filling in gaps in the absence of an agreement between the fiduciary and the
corporation regarding the fiduciary's right to compete. The court states that "a corporation
officer or other higher-echelon employee is barred from actively competing with his or her
employer during the tenure of the employment, even in the absence of an express covenant
so providing." Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 484 (emphasis added).
"80 One might argue that society is harmed if the private arrangements between the
company and the fiduciary impede competition. Such harm seems unlikely and is offset by
other efficiency gains. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. Further, the antitrust laws
are available to provide remedies for harmful anticompetitive contracts. In short, any
material third party effects from allowing the corporation and the fiduciary to work out their
own arrangements regarding the matter of competition seem highly speculative.
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to allow them to work out the terms of their arrangement and to employ this
efficient presumption when their preferences are not made explicit.'8 1
While Kentucky courts are clear and on sound ground regarding these
general rules, tough questions arise in connection with specific applications
of the rules. For example, Kentucky courts have considered the extent to
which a corporate fiduciary may make preparations to compete with his
corporation while continuing in his fiduciary position with the corporation.
Although it is difficult to articulate the precise point at which such
preparations violate a manager's fiduciary duty to his corporation,
Kentucky cases suggest that the point occurs early in the preparation
process. In Aero Drapery, the court stated that the corporate fiduciary
should have resigned from the corporation "when he first began
preparation to directly compete with" the corporation.'82 The court used
essentially the same language in Steelvest, stating that corporate fiduciaries
"should terminate their position.., when they first make arrangements or
begin preparations to compete directly with the ... corporation." '83
Part of the problem with articulating a more precise rule than one finds
in Aero Drapery or Steelvest is that the amount and sequencing of the
fiduciary's preparation steps will inevitably vary from case to case.
Nonetheless, one might imagine a typical preparation sequence in which
the fiduciary gets the idea of opening a competing business and then goes
about preparations, which might include: personal research into the matter;
seeking professional legal, accounting, and tax advice; arranging for
financing and investors; soliciting customers; and acquiring property and
the necessary managers and work force. In this sequence, the general
language from Aero Drapery'84 and Steelvest 85 suggest that anything
beyond one's personal research into the matter violates the duty not to
compete with the corporation.
It is sensible for Kentucky courts to apply a strict standard here and to
find that the duty of fiduciaries not to compete with their corporation
attaches early in the preparation process. Disclosure and waiver of the
conflict is a defense under Kentucky law to this potential breach of the duty
of loyalty; for this reason, managers should be encouraged early in the
process to disclose their competitive activities to their corporations.
' This presumption-that the parties most likely would not permit such
competition-is efficient because it most likely approximates the arrangement that most
parties would come to in most cases. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
182 Aero Drapery, 507 S.W.2d at 169.
183 Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 483.
184 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
185 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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Another difficult issue for Kentucky courts is the question of whether
there are any limitations on what the fiduciary can do once he has resigned
and begun his new business in competition with his old corporation. In his
new business, can the former fiduciary, for example, compete vigorously
with his old corporation for customers, supplies, and employees? The
language from Kentucky cases suggests a wide latitude for former
fiduciaries competing with their old corporations.' 86 Even after a proper
resignation, however, former managers can get themselves into trouble by
exploiting advantages improperly obtained while fiduciaries of the
corporation.
In Steelvest, for example, one part of the complaint was that the
fiduciary stole away employees for his new, competing company. Evidence
in the case, however, indicated that the fiduciary, prior to resignation, had
convinced some employees to leave the company for the fiduciary's new,
competing enterprise.'87 Similarly, in Aero Drapery'8" the fiduciary
provided his new, competing company with forms and charts from his prior
corporation. Again, while the use of those items occurred after the
resignation of the fiduciary, they were taken during the fiduciary's tenure
with the corporation.8 9 In both cases, therefore, the former fiduciary was
found to have breached a duty to his prior corporation by exploiting
advantages unfairly obtained while he was a manager of the prior
corporation.
To illuminate the distinction between permissible and impermissible
conduct, consider Steelvest, where the fiduciary breached his duty before
leaving the company by competing for the company's employees. It seems
apparent that, had the fiduciary waited until after he had severed his
relationship with his old company, he would then have been entirely free
to attempt to hire employees from his former company and otherwise to
compete with his old company in all areas.
86 See Aero Drapery, 507 S.W.2d at 169 (holding that, after resignation, a former
fiduciary, "[u]nless bound by contract," is able to enter into or create "a competing
enterprise").
117 The court in Steelvest stated:
There is also some evidence of record that prior to his resignation from Steelvest,
Scanlan indicated to prospective investors and to bank personnel that he would
bring with him some of the present employees of Steelvest. Just coincidentally/
inferentially .... shortly after Scanlan resigned from Steelvest, nine office and
supervisory employees left the company to work for Scansteel.
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 484.
"' Aero Drapery, 507 S.W.2d at 166.
19 Id. at 168 ("Prior to their resignations, [the fiduciaries] . . copied virtually every
form and chart used in Aero's business.").
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Another duty that follows the fiduciary into the new business is the
duty to maintain corporate confidences. The fiduciary in Aero Drapery
twice violated this duty. First, as described above, the fiduciary disclosed
the company's confidential forms and charts. 9 ° Second, the fiduciary
disclosed the terms of the company's "confidential stock bonus plan."''
The court indicated a significant breadth to the confidentially obligation
that continues even after resignation, stating that even after resignation a
fiduciary "may not use prior fiducial confidences to profit at the expense
of his former employer."' 92
In Kentucky, therefore, except for the duty not to exploit prior breaches
of fiduciary duties and the duty to maintain corporate confidences, former
fiduciaries who have properly terminated their relationship with their
corporations seem free to enter into fair and vigorous competition with their
former corporation.
C. Acquisitions
1. Overview Regarding the Application of Fiduciary Duties in
Corporate Acquisitions
In cases arising from corporate acquisitions, one should expect that
Kentucky courts will apply the broad fiduciary principles described in
Section III of this article. That is, Kentucky courts seem likely to apply a
business judgment standard to non-conflicted acquisitions, the intrinsic
fairness standard to deeply conflicted acquisitions, and the proportionality
test to quasi-conflicted acquisitions.
A number of specific issues involving acquisitions have arisen in
Kentucky courts. The following sections discuss the most important of
these acquisition issues. Regrettably, some of these decisions point courts
in the wrong direction with regard to the application of Kentucky's
fiduciary standards to corporate acquisitions but, fortunately, none of these
misapplications has yet been approved by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
2. Freezeouts and the Business Purpose Doctrine
In a freezeout, majority shareholders, by exercising their raw power to




19 2 1d. at 170.
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corporate stock in exchange for cash.' 93 Some, but not all, courts apply the
business purpose doctrine to such freezeouts. 19 4 Under that doctrine, a
freezeout violates the fiduciary duties owed to minority shareholders if the
freezeout "serves no business purposes other than the termination of the
minority stockholder's interest."' 95 The freezeout must, therefore, further
some "legitimate corporate purpose.
19 6
So defined, the business purpose doctrine only protects against
acquisitions that do not generate efficiencies or savings for the surviving
business. The doctrine itself does not protect against freezeouts that
unfairly expropriate value from shareholders. Standing alone, therefore, the
business purpose doctrine would permit a freezeout that is unfair to
minority shareholders so long as the surviving corporation captured some
savings or efficiencies as a result of the transaction.'97
' There is vast literature on corporate freezeouts. A modest sample of important earlier
articles includes: Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate
Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978); Edward F. Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers:
A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1976); Thomas L. Hazen, Management
Buyouts and Governance Paradigms, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1990); Elliott J. Weiss,
The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624 (1981); see
also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE
L.J. 698, 706 (1982) (analyzing the economic justifications for freezeouts).
Structurally, freezeouts can be achieved variously. Mergers are perhaps the most
common freezeout transactions. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977);
Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 342 A.2d 566 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975). Other
freezeout structures may involve dissolutions. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Georgia-Pacific Paper
Corp., 227 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Ark. 1964). Some may involve reverse stock splits. See, e.g.,
Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 322 N.E.2d 54 (I11. 974). Still others involve sales
of substantially all the corporation's assets otherwise than in the regular course of business.
See, e.g., Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 157 F. Supp. 895, 897 (D. Conn.
1954), aff'd, 251 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1957).
114 See, e.g., Laird v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 691 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1982);
Dower v. Mosser Indus., Inc., 648 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1981); Gabbart v. Gabhart, 370 N.E.2d
345 (Ind. 1977); Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112
(Mass. 1986); Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1984). Numerous
courts, however, have rejected the business purpose doctrine. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 704 (Del. 1983); Teschner, 322 N.E.2d 54, 54 (I11. 974); Rosenstein
v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 522 N.E.2d 221 (I11. App. Ct. 1988); Sifferle v. Micom Corp.,
384 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
195 In Berkowitz, the court defined the test as not being met if the freezeout "serves no
business purpose other than the termination of the minority stockholder's interest."
Berkowitz, 342 A.2d at 573 (citing and rejecting the approach of Bryan v. Brock & Blevins
Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974)).
196 Coggins, 492 N.E.2d at 1118 (emphasis added).
197 Easterbrook and Fischel list the following gains that may result from a freezeout of
minority shareholders: "economies of scale, centralized management and corporate planning,
... economies of information"; a lower "cost of policing conflicts of interest"; improved
ability "to make additional cost-justified investments"; "lower agency costs"; eliminating
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Courts that use the business purpose doctrine apply it in addition to,
and not in lieu of, the intrinsic fairness test. 198 This means that in states that
accept the business purpose doctrine, the freezeout must meet the intrinsic
fairness test (fair dealing and fair price) and also must generate some
benefit for the surviving corporation as a whole. A failure to meet either
amounts to a violation of fiduciary duties.199
In Yeager v. Paul Semonin Co.,200 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
rejected the business purpose test. The case was brought by a minority
shareholder who was frozen out of his corporation in a statutory merger and
claimed that the merger's "whole purpose was to eliminate ... minority
stockholders."2"1 In finding against the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals
reasoned that the plain language of the Kentucky statutes permits mergers
for any purpose (including the purpose of freezing out minority
shareholders) and that appraisal offered an approved and fair remedy for
such disgruntled shareholders.20 2
Although it is a close call, the outcome in Yeager is probably sound.
The business purpose doctrine offers no meaningful additional protection
to minority shareholders, nor does it improve economic efficiency.
Applying the doctrine does, however, at least marginally increase the
transactional costs of moving assets into more efficient hands.
As a way of demonstrating that the business purpose doctrine offers no
meaningful protection to minority shareholders, consider the following
examples. First, assume that, before a freezeout occurs, the total value of
a corporation is $100, the value of the majority's stock is $60, and the value
of the minority's stock is $40. As a result of the freezeout, efficiency gains
the total value to $120, but decreases the value of the minority
shareholders' interest to $30.
This transaction does not violate the business purpose doctrine. Even
though minority shareholders were harmed economically by the freezeout,
the benefit to the "corporation," demonstrated by the increase in the firm's
value, satisfies the requirement of a "business purpose." Also important for
this discussion, however, is the point that the transaction would likely
"costs attributable to public ownership"; reducing the obstacles to the company's being
acquired. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 193, at 706.
198 Coggins, 492 N.E.2d at 1116-17.
'99 See, e.g., id. at 1112; Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 479 N.E.2d 173 (Mass. 1985); Alpert,
473 N.E.2d at 19.
200 Yeager v. Paul Semonin Co., 69 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
201 Id. at 228.
202 See id. at 228-29 (noting that appraisal "presents a generally fair and a reasonable
alternative to frequent and protracted litigation").
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violate the intrinsic fairness test, since $30 would not amount to a "fair
price" for the frozen out minority shareholders.0 3
Now consider a purely expropriative merger. Assume the same
pre-freezeout numbers-$100 in total value, with $60 in value for majority
and $40 for minority. Assume that the minority shareholders are frozen out
at the unfairly low price of $30 per share, but that there are no efficiency
gains from the freezeout. The post-freezeout value of the corporation,
therefore, stays at $100. The transaction, in short, is driven solely by the
majority's desire to expropriate part of the minority's value, thus clearly
violating the business purpose test. In all likelihood, however, the
transaction would also violate the intrinsic fairness standard, since $30 does
not amount to a fair price.2" Even in the case of a purely expropriative
freezeout-which is the only instance in which the business purpose
doctrine is applicable-the business purpose doctrine adds no beneficial
protection to the interests of the minority; they are equally well protected
by the applicability of the intrinsic fairness doctrine.
It is hard to see, therefore, how the business purpose doctrine helps
minority shareholders. This conclusion is even more vivid when one
considers the ease with which the majority is able to demonstrate some
efficiency or gain from the freezeout. It is hard to imagine many
transactions in which the majority could not offer some evidence of
efficiencies created by a freezeout. Indeed, elimination of SEC filing
requirements, attainment of subchapter S tax status, and operational
efficiencies come to mind easily as benefits that will satisfy the business
purpose doctrine.20 5
Thus, the business purpose doctrine hardly seems worth the trouble,
and Yeager is on sound ground in rejecting it.
3. The Exclusivity of Appraisal as a Remedy for Unhappy Shareholders
Another issue courts have considered in connection with acquisitions
is the extent to which statutory appraisal is an exclusive remedy.0 6 Most
typically, the issue has arisen in the context of an affiliated merger, where
minority shareholders, who unquestionably have statutory appraisal rights,
203 In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme Court
held that a court must consider both fair dealing and fair price in evaluating whether a
freezeout met the intrinsic fairness test. For a discussion of "fair price," see Rutheford B
Campbell, Jr., Fair Value and Fair Price in Corporate Acquisitions, 78 N.C. L. REV. 101,
127-33 (1999) [hereinafter Campbell, Fair Value].
204 See supra note 119.
205 See supra note 195.
206 See Cox & HAZEN, supra note 58, at 630-33.
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may want to press their fiduciary claims under the intrinsic fairness
doctrine.2 7
The better position for Kentucky would be to consider appraisal as a
non-exclusive remedy, giving shareholders the right to pursue a remedy for
a breach of fiduciary duty, whether or not they may also have an appraisal
remedy. The language of Kentucky's appraisal statute supports this
position. Allowing shareholders with appraisal rights to pursue remedies
for breaches of fiduciary duties also promotes economic efficiency and
fairness.
The Kentucky appraisal statute states that a "shareholder entitled to
dissent... shall not challenge the corporate action.., unless the action is
unlawful or fraudulent. '20 8 "Unlawful" in Kentucky's appraisal statute is
not defined, but it appears to be a broad concept that includes more than
just criminal violations.2 9 Thus, for example, a merger effected in violation
of the statutorily required voting or quorum prerequisites210 would be
207 Weinberger, 457 A.2d 701, is an example of such a case. In Weinberger, UOP was
merged into its parent, Signal. Minority shareholders of UOP, who were offered cash in the
transaction, were entitled to appraisal rights but chose instead to pursue fiduciary claims
against defendants that included Signal and the UOP board. See id.
'0' K.R.S. § 271B. 13-020(2) (Banks-Baldwin 2004). A similar standard was used in
an earlier Kentucky case that was decided before the adoption of the most recent version of
Kentucky's corporate statutes. In Yeager v. Paul Semonin Co., 691 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1985), the Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded that, while generally appraisal is the
exclusive remedy for shareholders unhappy with a merger, it would not infer "a legislative
purpose to deny judicial relief in a merger situation where illegality or fraud are involved."
Id. at 228.
Corporate statutes typically address the matter of the exclusivity of appraisal. For
example, the Model Business Corporation Act makes appraisal exclusive unless the
transaction either "(1) was not effectuated in accordance with [the MBCA] ... or the
corporation's articles of incorporation, bylaws or board ofdirectors's resolution authorizing
the corporate action; or (2) was procured as a result of fraud or material misrepresentation."
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.02(d) (1984). The Official Comment to the Model Business
Corporation Act emphasizes that the provision applies only to "challenges ... to the
corporate action." The comment states that "it does not address remedies, if any, that
shareholders may have against directors or other persons as a result of the corporate action."
See id. cmt. 5.
Not all state statutes address the matter of exclusivity. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 262 (2004). Delaware deals with the issue as a matter of common law. For a discussion of
the development of the exclusivity rule, see Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777
A.2d 242, 244-47 (Del. 2001).
209 "Unlawful," the statutory term, and "illegal," the term used in Yeager, 691 S.W. 2d
at 228, seem interchangeable. For an overview of the manner in which courts have
interpreted the terms "fraud" and "illegality" in the context of the matter of appraisal
exclusivity, see Cox & HAZEN, supra note 58, at 630-33.
210 Under Kentucky law, a merger must be approved by "a majority of all the votes
entitled to be cast on the plan." K.R.S. § 271B. 11-030(5).
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"unlawful," even though the failure to obtain a proper vote or quorum
would not be criminal. Similarly, a merger effected in violation of the
directors' fiduciary duty under Kentucky's common law or business
judgment statute21! should similarly be considered "unlawful." Kentucky
statutory law requires directors to adopt a resolution approving a merger
and to "recommend" the merger to shareholders.1 2 If those directors'
actions are not undertaken on "an informed basis" or pursuant to an honest
belief that the actions are in the best interests of the company, the actions
are "unlawful" and thus outside the exclusivity of Kentucky's appraisal
statute.1 3
This position-that appraisal rights do not exclude the right to pursue
claims of a breach of fiduciary duties in mergers-is essentially the
position at which the Delaware courts arrived over a period of years.' 4 In
the Glassman case, the Delaware Supreme Court summed up the Delaware
rule by stating that Delaware cases "effectively eliminated appraisal as the
exclusive remedy for any claim alleging breach of the duty of entire
fairness."2 5
Allowing shareholders of Kentucky corporations to pursue appraisal
remedies and remedies for breaches of fiduciary duties is sound policy
since it reduces incentives for managers and controlling shareholders of
companies to undermanage the company as part of a strategy to expropriate
shareholder value. Shareholders pursuing a fiduciary remedy are thought
to have a greater right to share the synergy generated by a merger than they
have in an appraisal proceeding. Under Kentucky law, for example, the
only appraisal remedy for dissenting shareholders in mergers is the right to
"obtain payment of the fair value of his shares," 26 and the amount of the
211 See § 271B.8-300.
212 See § 271 B. 11-030(1)-(2).
213 The legal obligations of directors under Kentucky's business judgment statute
include the obligation to consider the merger in "good faith," on "an informed basis," and
"[iln a manner he honestly believes to be in the best interests of the corporation." § 27 1B.8-
300(l).
214 See Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242,244-47 (Del. 2001).
215 Id. at 247. The Glassman court, relying on the earlier case of Rabkin v. Philip A.
Hunt Chemical Corp., 498 A.2d 1009 (Del. 1985), noted that "appraisal is the exclusive
remedy only if stockholders' complaints are limited to judgmental factors of valuation."
Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247 (internal citations omitted). The court continued: "Rabkin,
through its interpretation of Weinberger, effectively eliminated appraisal as the exclusive
remedy for any claim alleging breach of the duty of entire fairness." Id. In Glassman,
however, the Delaware court held that there is no duty "to establish entire fairness" in a short
form merger. Id at 248. Effectively, therefore, this holding makes appraisal the exclusive
remedy for shareholders of Delaware companies that engage in short form mergers.
216 See K.R.S. § 271B.13-020(l).
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"payment"--which is inevitably cash-excludes "appreciation or
depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action."2 8 Where disgruntled
shareholders in an acquisition are able to pursue fiduciary duty remedies,
however, courts are much more willing to award damages that include their
proportionate share of the synergistic gain from the transaction.22" '
Consider how a rational control shareholder might act in a regime in
which appraisal does not include a proportionate share of the synergy
generated by a merger, but appraisal is the exclusive remedy for a
shareholder. Imagine a situation like Weinberger, where Parent owns a
majority of Subsidiary. Assume that the minority shareholders' interest in
Subsidiary is worth $100 if Subsidiary is well managed, but worth only $80
if Subsidiary is poorly managed. If appraisal is the exclusive remedy for
disgruntled shareholders, Parent, with help from its nominees in
Subsidiary's management, seemingly can generate monetary gain for itself
by causing Subsidiary to be undermanaged, thus driving down the market
value of Subsidiary to $80. If Parent then freezes out the minority, Parent
may reasonably anticipate that the minority's appraisal right would be
valued at $80, instead of $100, since the $20 difference looks like
"synergy" that is generated by moving the assets of Subsidiary into more
efficient hands. Parent, therefore, under a regime that makes appraisal
exclusive, has a financial incentive to undermanage Subsidiary's assets;
this is an inefficient result. 2
28 § 271B. 13-010(3). The statute permits the inclusion of appreciation in "fair value"
if "exclusion [of appreciation] would be inequitable." Id. In a prior article, I found that
courts may be willing to award dissenting shareholders some portion of the gains from
acquisitions, notwithstanding the type of language recited by courts in the text ofthis article.
See Campbell, Fair Value, supra note 203, at 116-27.
22 1 Although articulating the matter in somewhat confusing language, the court in
Weinberger authorized "rescissory damages" in cases involving breaches of the duty of
intrinsic fairness. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,714 (Del. 1983). Rescissory
damages award the successful plaintiff an amount equal to the gains of the
wrongdoer-defendant. See, e.g., Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981)
(measuring the damage to a target corporation's shareholders by the increment in value to
the bidder). Rescissory damages, therefore, allow the plaintiff to recover the synergy created
by the transaction.
For an extensive discussion of the valuation of dissenting shareholders' appraisal rights
(fair value) and the valuation of claims involving breaches of fiduciary duties in acquisitions
(fair price), see Campbell, Fair Value, supra note 203, at 116-34. The right of dissenting
shareholders in appraisal proceedings to a proportionate share of synergy is discussed, id.
at 122-27; the rights of shareholders to share pro rata in synergy through a fiduciary duty
proceeding is also discussed, id. at 129-33.
222 Probably one of the most egregious examples of this is the case involving the
freezeout of the minority shareholders of the Kirby Lumber Corporation. See Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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If, on the other hand, the intrinsic fairness standard were also available
to minority shareholders of Subsidiary, they would have a better chance of
securing their proportionate share of the $20 in "synergy." This in turn
lessens the incentive for Parent to engage in inefficient conduct by
undermanaging Subsidiary.
This matter can be restated in terms of the unfairness to Subidiary's
minority shareholders. When shareholders invest in a company, they are
entitled to assume that managers will pursue their. best interests. That
assumption-which is backed up by the law of corporate fiduciary
duties-is impounded in the price shareholders pay for their shares. As a
simple demonstration of this point, consider the likely impact on the price
of a company's stock if management suddenly announced that they were no
longer going to act in the best interests of shareholders. One would assume
that the price of that stock would immediately drop in value.
Rules that protect against undermanagement, therefore, protect the ex
ante expectations and pricing of shareholders. Shareholders determine the
price they are willing to pay for stock based on assumptions about how
managers will act. Thus, to allow managers to vary from the agreed-upon
assumptions is not only economically inefficient but also unfair to
shareholders and investors.
4. Calculating Present Value in Acquisitions
In Ford v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., the Kentucky Court of
Appeals applied a marketability discount to the valuation of dissenters'
shares and also determined the present value of dissenters' rights by using
a weighted average valuation method.223 Both of these holdings point
Kentucky in the wrong direction concerning important shareholder rights.
The misdirection may be largely due to the fact that Ford was decided over
20 years ago, before courts collectively gained substantial experience in
acquisition cases and an appreciation for the economic realities in play
when acquisitions occur. Kentucky should follow the lead of its progressive
sister states and reverse its position on both of these important matters.224
12 Ford v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
224 The most recent version of the Model Business Corporation Act, for example,
explicitly rejects the application of either, a minority or marketability discount in the
calculation of fair value in appraisals. MODELBUS. CoRP. ACT § 13.01 (4)(iii) (1984) ("[F]air
value means the value of the corporation's shares determined... without discounting for a
lack of marketability or minority status.").
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a. Minority and Marketability Discounts
A company that is the subject of an appraisal proceeding may claim
that the dissenting shareholders' award should be reduced by a
marketability discount and also perhaps by a minority discount. A
marketability discount may be applied when the stock that is the subject of
the appraisal is not actively traded. The claim supporting this discount is
that company shares that have no active, efficient trading market are worth
less than shares in an identical company that are traded in an active,
efficient market. A minority discount, on the other hand, may be applied in
a situation in which the dissenting shareholders hold a minority interest in
a company that is controlled by a single shareholder or a cohesive block of
shareholders. Once again, the claim is that the market will discount such
minority shares.225
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Ford was presented the issue of
whether to apply a marketability discount when determining appraisal
value.2 6 An appraiser appointed by the' lower court had applied a
twenty-five percent marketability discount to the fair value of the
dissenters' shares, which the lower court accepted.' The Court of Appeals
agreed with the lower court and thus applied the twenty-five percent
marketability discount to the fair value of the dissenters' shares.227 The
court in Ford was not asked to consider a minority discount to the fair
value of the dissenters' shares. No other case in Kentucky has ever
considered the matter of a minority discount.
Applying a marketability or minority discount to fair value is bad
economics and encourages unfair treatment of shareholders. In many
instances, it provides an incentive for controlling stockholders to engage in
inefficient conduct that reduces shareholder "Value and facilitates
unwarranted wealth transfers to themselves at the expense of minority
shareholders. This is easily illustrated in the context of minority discounts.
Commentators have properly observed that an efficient market may
discount a company's minority shares when there is an identifiable,
225 This discount is a corollary of the notion that a control block of stock will command
a "control premium" when it is sold. Both notions are based on the power of a majority to
expropriate for itself a disproportionate portion of the company's value. See supra notes
212-14 and accompanying text.
226 Ford, 639 S.W.2d at 553. Although Ford was decided under a prior version of
Kentucky's corporate law, Kentucky's present appraisal statute also allows the court in its
discretion to appoint an appraiser to advise the court in appraisal cases. K.R.S. § 271 B. 13-
300(4) (Banks-Baldwin 2004).
227 See Ford, 639 S.W.2d at 556.
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controlling shareholder.228 One reason for this minority discount is that the
market fears the majority will expropriate a disproportionate share of the
company's value. There are various ways this can be accomplished. In a
closely held corporation (or even a larger corporation), for example, the
controlling shareholders can pay themselves and their affiliates overly
generous salaries and consulting fees, or cause the company to purchase
supplies and services from themselves or their affiliates at overly generous
prices. Perhaps the most notorious way for a majority to acquire a
disproportionate amount of the corporate value is to freeze out the minority
at a low price. 29 Thus, in anticipation of such transactions, the efficient
market reduces the price of the minority shares. Because the market prices
stock as a function of anticipated cash flows and the market fears that the
majority will expropriate a disproportionate share of the company's future
cash flows for itself, securities traders rationally discount the value of the
minority's shares.
To allow a majority shareholder (in a freezeout transaction, for
example) to acquire the minority interest without having to pay the minority
discount allows the majority shareholder to profit from unfair and
inefficient conduct. It creates an incentive for an economically rational
acquirer to obtain fifty-one percent of a company and then to drive down
the price of the company's stock by undermanaging the company or
expropriating minority shareholders' value or by threatening such under-
management or expropriation. 3°
228 See, e.g., Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority
Shareholders andlts Impact on Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTREDAMEL. REv. 425,
478 (1990).
229 Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and
Reorganizations, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1072, 1099 (1983); Theodore N. Mirvis, Two-Tier
Pricing: Some Appraisal and "Entire Fairness " Valuation Issues, 38 BUs. LAW. 485, 489
(1983); Carole B. Silver, Fair Dealing Comes ofAge in the Regulation of Going Private
Transactions, 9 J. CORP. L. 385, 396 (1983-84).
230 Putting some simple numbers on this example may make the point clearer. Assume
that prior to the acquisition of a control block, a company has 100 shares of common stock
outstanding, each of which is selling in the efficient market for $10. The assumed total value
of the company's outstanding stock is $1000. The aggressor acquires 51 of the shares. We
might then assume that the efficient market, for the reasons discussed in the text, discounts
the 49 shares representing the minority interest from the prior price of $10 per share to a
price of$8 per share. Thus, the total value of that minority interest decreased from $490 (49
shares at $10 per share) to $392 (49 shares at $8 per share). Allowing fair value to be
determined with the minority discount means that the minority suffered a loss of $98 ($490
- $392) as a result of the mismanagement and expropriation threat of the aggressor. Legal
rules should not permit one to capitalize on such threats; it is both inefficient and unfair.
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While perhaps less vividly apparent, a similar analysis supports
rejection of any marketability discount, contrary to the position taken by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals in the Ford case.
Corporate managers owe a duty to maximize the wealth of their
shareholders.2 " One important way of doing this is for managers to
minimize the transaction costs that shareholders encounter when buying
and selling the company's stock. If, on the other hand, managers' actions
increase trading costs by disrupting economical trading arrangements or
failing to facilitate the creation of efficient trading markets, the value of the
company's shares falls and shareholder wealth decreases.
Allowing a marketability discount in fair value in an appraisal
proceeding allows a controlling shareholder to generate gain for itself by
throttling efficient trading in the company's stock, which drives down the
market price of the stock and captures that value in a freezeout
transaction.232 Only by obligating the majority shareholder to pay an
amount that includes a marketability discount is the incentive for such
inefficient and unfair conduct removed.
Notwithstanding the Ford case, lawyers planning acquisitions and
investment bankers and other evaluators providing fair value estimates in
acquisition settings should not assume that Kentucky courts will apply a
marketability or minority discount in appraisal settings. It seems more
likely that Kentucky courts will take the first available opportunity to
overrule that aspect of Ford and thus provide incentives for senior officers
and controlling shareholders of Kentucky corporations to manage those
businesses efficiently and fairly.
231 See supra notes 7-51 and accompanying text.
232 In an extreme case, an acquirer could purchase fifty-one percent of a company and
then cause the company to de-list from an exchange or Nasdaq. This would almost certainly
cause a reduction in the price of the company's stock, since transaction costs in acquiring
and selling the company's stock would become higher after de-listing. If the acquirer then
freezes out the minority and is not obligated to pay them for the loss in value-i.e., is able
to freeze them out without paying the marketability discount-there is an incentive for a
controlling shareholder to engage in non-value maximizing conduct. The outcome is once
again both inefficient and unfair to the minority shareholders.
A more subtle, but nonetheless troubling, version of this can occur in a more closely
held company with limited trading activity. In such a case, if a majority shareholder is able
to freezeout out a minority without paying the minority discount, he also has an economic
incentive to maintain high trading transaction costs, which again is inefficient and unfair to
the minority.




The court in Ford utilized a weighted average valuation method in
determining the fair value of dissenters' rights. 3 In a weighted average
valuation, an evaluator establishes up to four different valuations, each of
which is based on a separate factor. The most common factors utilized by
courts when arriving at a weighted average value of a company or a portion
of a company are: market value, asset value, earnings value, and dividend
value. To arrive at a final weighted average value, the evaluator, after
selecting the components and putting a value on each, assigns weights to
each factor.234 At the time Ford was decided in 1982, Delaware courts
mandated the use of a weighted average valuation method in all Delaware
acquisition cases. Indeed, the weighted average method was often called the
Delaware block approach.235
In the year following the Forddecision, however, Delaware abandoned
mandatory use ofthe weighted average valuation method in the Weinberger
case, declaring that the "weighted average method of valuation.., shall no
longer exclusively control such proceedings." '236 Instead, the court
concluded that courts must use "a more liberal approach... [that includes]
233 See Ford v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Ky. Ct. App.
1982).
234 To use a concrete example, assume that the evaluator determines market value to be
$100, asset value to be $110, earnings value to be S120, and dividend value to be $130 and
weights the components respectively at 20%, 30%, 30%, and 20%. The present value would
be determined as follows:
$100 x .2 = $20
$110 x.3 = $33
$120 x .3 = $36
$130 x.2 -$26
Present value = $115
"The weights assigned to factors vary from case to case, and, indeed, not all of the four
factors are accorded weight in all cases. Dividend value, for example, is the particular
element of value that is omitted from consideration most often." Rutheford B Campbell, Jr.
The Impact of Modern Finance Theory in Acquisition Cases, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 16
(2003) [hereinafter Campbell, The Impact of Modern Finance Theory].
233 For a discussion of the Delaware block method and the manner in which Delaware
courts applied the method prior to Weinberger, see J. Steven Rogers, Note, The Dissenting
Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKLA L. REv. 629, 641-42 (1977); Note, Valuation
of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1453, 1467 (1966).
Even before Weinberger, however, Delaware courts sometimes failed to follow all
aspects of the Delaware block approach. See, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l,
Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 433 (Del. Ch. 1968) ("[W]e are not obliged to blindly use past earnings
without reference to other factors of record.").
236 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983).
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proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally
considered acceptable in the financial community.
211
Although Weinberger clearly manifested a lack of confidence in the
validity of the weighted average method of valuation, jurisdictions,
including to some extent Delaware, continue to utilize the weighted average
method of valuation in a significant number of cases. Since Weinberger,
non-Delaware jurisdictions have used the weighted average method in
about half of their valuation cases, while Delaware has utilized the method
in approximately fifteen percent of its valuation cases.23 s Non-Delaware
jurisdictions actually seem to be increasing slightly their dependence on the
weighted average method in acquisition cases.23
Ford appears to mandate a weighted average valuation method as the
exclusive valuation method to be used in all Kentucky appraisal cases. At
one point, for example, the court stated that "in all appraisals or valuations
of fair value of stock, pursuant to [Kentucky's appraisal statute] ... the
three elements to be considered in computation of the fair value of shares
.. are market value, investment or earnings value, and net asset value."
240
At another point, the court stated that "the weight to be given to each
element depends on the circumstances of each individual case."24'
While on its face this language is confined to appraisal proceedings,
one also might expect the same valuation methodology to be used in other
settings involving business valuations, since there seems no logical reason
to vary valuation methodologies as a function of the legal issue before the
court. Thus, for example, one should expect the valuation methodology
used by courts in appraisal cases also to be used in a. case in which a
minority shareholder complains that managers and controlling shareholders
violated their fiduciary duties by failing to accord minority shareholders a
"fair price" in an affiliated merger.
237 Id. at 713.
238 In an article published in 2003, I found that in seventy-seven cases decided in
various jurisdictions after Weinberger (1983), courts in thirty percent of those cases used a
weighted average method of valuation. See Campbell, The Impact of Modern Finance
Theory, supra note 234, at 18 tbl. 1. Forty three of the seventy-seven cases were decided in
Delaware, where the courts used the weighted average valuation method in fourteen percent
of the cases. See id. at 22 tbl.4. Thirty-four of the seventy-seven cases were decided in
non-Delaware jurisdictions, where the weighted average method of valuation was used in
fifty percent of the cases. See id at 22 tbl.5.
239 Id. at 25 tbl.8 & tbl.9. (in non-Delaware jurisdictions, forty-four percent of cases
decided between Weinberger and the end of 1990 used the weighted average valuation
method; fifty-six percent of all cases decided after 1990 used the weighted average valuation
method).24 Ford v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553,556 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
241 Id. at 555.
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Notwithstanding the strong and potentially expansive language in Ford,
Kentucky courts should take the first available opportunity to reject a
weighted average valuation methodology as an acceptable way to arrive at
present value in acquisition cases. The weighted average method of
valuation has never made any sense. It is riddled with double counting and
indirection or, more appropriately, misdirection. 42 With regard to the
double counting matter, consider the three factors used in Ford-market
value, earnings value, and net asset value.243 Market value impounds both
the value of the company's earnings and its net assets. Obviously an
efficient market will place a higher value on a firm with high earnings than
on an identical firm with low earnings. Similarly, a firm with a lot of net
assets will enjoy a higher market value than an identical firm with few net
assets, since the net assets will provide more of a cushion in the event of a
business failure. 2" In using the Ford approach, therefore, one is either
double counting earnings and net assets or somehow weighting earnings
and net assets to avoid double counting. The latter is difficult even to
conceptualize, let alone apply.
Another problem with the weighted average methodology, apparent in
the foregoing discussion, is the matter of how one selects the various
weights assigned to the individual components of value. Sensible criteria
for weighting have never been established or, indeed, even offered.245 Thus,
242 The weighted average method of valuation has been the focus of sharp theoretical
criticism over the years. See, e.g., Joseph Evan Calio, New Appraisals of Old Problems:
Reflections on the Delaware Appraisal Proceeding, 32 AM. BUS. L. J. 1, 38-41 (1994).
243 The Delaware block approach often used less than all four of the components
described above. See Campbell, The Impact of Modern Finance Theory, supra note 234, at
16. The component most often omitted is dividend value. See VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM
W. BRATTON, BRUDNEY AND CHIRELSTEIN'S CORPORATE FINANCE CASES AND MATERIALS
708-09 (4th ed. 1993) (noting that in only two of eighteen reported cases was dividend value
included in a Delaware block evaluation).
244 For example, assume both Firm A and Firm B have the same expected earnings of
$100 in each of the next three years. Because of economic uncertainties, each firm has a 20%
chance of discontinuing operations at the end of the three years. Firm A, however, in order
to operate during the period will maintain net assets that constantly will be worth $100,
while Firm B will maintain net assets worth only $10. The efficient market will likely place
a higher value on Firm A, since the net assets of Firm A provide a cushion for the owners
of Firm A in the event of a business failure at the end of the three-year period.
245 See Campbell, Fair Value, supra note 203, at 39; see also Calio, supra note 242, at
37 ("[V]irtually no weighting guidelines exist."). Calio goes on to explain that "[t]he weight
assigned to each of the [components] . .. is usually reflective of the confidence level or
accuracy of each element's valuation." Id. I offered a critical comment on this theory of
weighting:
To assign weights according to the court's confidence in the accuracy of the
particular factor is, at best, sophistry. The fact, for example, that a court can most
accurately determine the liquidation value of the corporation says nothing about
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the statement in Ford that "the weight to be given to each element depends
on the circumstances of each individual case ' 246 is typical in that it provides
no hint regarding any sensible, principled basis for assigning weights in
future cases.247
Instead of the tired and theoretically flawed weighted average method
of valuation, Kentucky courts should adopt a discounted cash flow
valuation methodology for use in all acquisitions cases. Under the
discounted cash flow method, the evaluator projects the expected return
from the investment. To arrive at a present value, the total expected return
is discounted in order to reflect the time value of money and the economic
risk inherent in the anticipated cash flow.24
Fundamentally, the superiority of a discounted cash flow valuation is
due to the fact that the methodology proceeds from rational "psychological
and behavioral bases for economic value." '249 Rational people invest their
money-thereby deferring consumption and alternate uses of their
money-because they believe that the investment will make money for
them in the future. How much a rational investor is willing to pay for any
investment, therefore, depends on how many dollars they expect to receive
over a given period of time, how much they value alternate uses of the
whether using such a valuation is consistent with the court's obligation. Courts are
not obliged to select an improper method of valuation simply because it is easy to
calculate."
Campbell, The Impact of Modern Finance Theory, supra note 234, at 39 n. 138.
Ford v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
247 Since the goal in appraisal and other valuations growing out of acquisition litigation
is to arrive at some sort of market value, see, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663
A.2d 1134, 1143 (Del. Ch. 1994) ("the highest value reasonably achievable"), aff'd, 663
A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995), it would be logical to assign the same weights to various factors as
the market would assign. The best evidence of that, of course, is the market value itself, if
the market for the company's stock is efficient and unflawed. In most instances, however,
the actual market value is unsuitable for valuation purposes, because of imperfect
information (for example, material information about the company may be hidden from the
market), mismanagement or undermanagement (for example, a parent company that intends
to acquire the publicly held minority interest in its majority owned subsidiary may, in
anticipation of the acquisition, drive down the market price of the subsidiary's publicly held
minority interest by undermanaging or mismanaging the subsidiary), or structural matters
(for example, an efficient market may lower the value of a company that has an identifiable
majority shareholder, since investors may fear an unfairly priced acquisition by the parent).
248 For an expansive discussion of the discounted cash flow method of valuation, see
Samuel C. Thompson, A Lawyer's Guide to Modern Valuation Techniques in Mergers and
Acquisitions, 21 J. CORP. L. 457 (1996).
249 In an earlier article, I argued that there is a "disconnect between the factors and their
assigned weights under the Delaware block approach . .. and the psychological and
behavioral bases of economic value .... Campbell, The Impact of Modern Finance
Theory, supra note 234, at 39-40.
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money they intend to invest, and the risk associated with the expected
return. Thus, for example, an investor will pay more (i.e., assign a higher
present value) for an investment with higher anticipated cash flows but will
pay less (assign a lower present value) for an investment that is more risky.
The discounted cash flow method of valuation focuses directly on these
critical elements ofpresent value. An evaluator using this method is obliged
to quantify both the anticipated cash flows and the discount factor, which
is, in turn, a quantification of risk and the time value of money. Financial
economists overwhelmingly agree that a discounted cash flow methodology
is the correct way to estimate present value.25 ° Uniformly, this valuation
method is extensively utilized and taught in financial texts. For example,
Professors Brealey and Myers' widely adopted text, Principles of
Corporate Finance, devotes many pages to an explanation and utilization
of the discounted cash flow method.25" ' At one particular point in their
textbook, the authors unequivocally state that "[v]atue today always equals
future cash flow discounted at the opportunity cost of capital."2"2
Not surprisingly, more sophisticated courts now rely more heavily on
the discounted cash flow method of valuation. Data indicate, for example,
that in Delaware, during the first eight years after courts were freed from
mandatory use of the weighted average method, courts relied on the
discounted cash flow method of valuation in forty-four percent of their
cases."' In later cases, the Delaware court utilized a discounted cash flow
method in fifty-two percent of its cases.254 Even these Delaware numbers
are disappointing, since the discounted cash flow method is inevitably the
way courts should determine present value.255 Nonetheless, the data
250 See id. at 5.
251 See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 59-73 (5th ed. 1996) (applying discounted cash flow to valuing corporate
securities and businesses).
252 Id. at 73. The "opportunity cost of capital" impounds risk and the time value of
money. See also Mukesh Bajaj et al., Firm Value and Marketability Discounts, 27 J. CORP.
L. 89, 91 (2001) ("[T]he price of any asset is given by the present value of the cash flow to
be received from owning the asset.").
253 Campbell, The Impact of Modern Finance Theory, supra note 234, at 26 tbl.6.
254 Id. at tbl.7.
... It is nearly impossible to imagine a case in which the use ofthe discounted cash flow
is inappropriate. For example, imagine a case in which the assets of a company are worth
more liquidated than as a going concern, and so the company is to be liquidated and should,
therefore, be valued as a liquidated entity. Even then, one should utilize a discounted cash
flow method of valuation. It would be inappropriate to value the company based entirely on
the cash that will be recognized from the sale of the company's net assets. This is because
it will take some time to liquidate the company, thus the asset value must be discounted for
the time value of money, and the amount to be received at the sale is not a sum certain, and
thus the amount must be discounted for risk. If one assumes in this example that the
[VOL. 93
CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
demonstrate that the discounted cash flow method has significant traction
with the sophisticated Delaware court.
25 6
By adopting a discounted cash flow methodology for all acquisition
cases, Kentucky courts could establish a valuation method that is founded
on realistic psychological and behavioral bases, overwhelmingly supported
by modem finance theory and significantly supported by enlightened court
opinions from sister jurisdictions.
V. CONCLUSION
Considered as a whole, Kentucky statutes and cases offer a surprisingly
deep source of corporate fiduciary rules and principles. Properly inter-
preted, these rules and principles are generally sound.
Kentucky law obligates corporate managers to act in the best interests
of shareholders, subject to the right of managers to make limited amounts
of wealth transfers to other constituencies. This is a position consistent with
the common and statutory law of Kentucky's sister states. Also in sync with
sister states is Kentucky law's suggestion that fiduciary duties vary
depending on whether the corporate manager is engaged in monitoring or
making a discrete decision. Regarding the making of discrete decisions by
fiduciaries, one should expect-especially in light of Kentucky's
common-law traditions-that Kentucky courts will impose increasingly
higher standards on fiduciaries as their depth of conflict increases.
Accordingly, Kentucky courts are likely to limit the applicability of
Kentucky's business judgment statutes to unconflicted, discrete decisions
and confirm as a matter of common law the applicability of the
proportionality test for quasi-conflicted discrete decisions and the intrinsic
fairness test for deeply conflicted discrete decisions.
In a number of areas, Kentucky's common law is sound. Examples of
this include Kentucky's strong version of managers' obligation to disclose
material facts about the corporation and its economically sensible approach
liquidation will be completed in one year and that there is a 50% chance that the net assets
will bring $100 and a 50% chance that the net assets will bring $80, the expected value of
the "cash flow," which is $90, must be discounted because it will not be received for one
year and there is some risk that the receipt will be something different than $90. See
Campbell, The Impact of Modern Finance Theory, supra note 234, at 9-10.
256 Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, the discounted cash flow would be
substantially easier for courts to manage than other valuations, such as the weighted average
method. See Campbell, The Impact of Modern Finance Theory, supra, note 234, at 46-47
("[J]udgments courts... are asked to make... involve more of the types of decisions that




to the right of fiduciaries to compete with their corporations. Kentucky
courts, however, still face challenges. Courts must avoid adopting the
confusing analyses that seem to permeate much of Delaware's common
law. Fiduciary duty rules should be approached clearly, directly, and simply
as standards of conduct that are based on traditional tort norms and offer
remedies to shareholders harmed by managers' failure to follow the
prescribed standards. Kentucky courts, therefore, should view their
function in terms of enforcing a standard of conduct and not in terms of
applying a standard of review. Similarly, a violation of the business
judgment statutes by a Kentucky fiduciary should render the case one for
damages. In such circumstances, Kentucky courts should not engage in
another analysis under the intrinsic fairness standard before constructing
remedies.
Finally, it is in the area of acquisitions that Kentucky seems to be most
misdirected. While it is sound to reject the business purpose doctrine and
the exclusivity of appraisal rights, Kentucky should also reject minority and
marketability discounts and use of the weighted average method for
valuations. The development of fiduciary principles has shown the
inappropriateness of such discounts, and modem finance theory uniformly
accepts the discounted cash flow method as the way to calculate the present
value of a business.
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